The role of the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MonUC) with regard to democracy and human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by Bope, Mikobi Eugene
The role of the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUC) with regard to democracy and human rights in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
 
by 
MIKOBI Eugène BOPE 
Student Number: 0714618H 
 
 
 
Final Dissertation 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
in 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
at the  
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND 
 
SUPERVISOR: Natalie Zähringer 
 
 
APRIL 2011 
 
ii 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Mikobi Eugène Bope, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own 
original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any 
university for a degree. 
 
 
 
 
     
Mikobi Eugene BOPE, 19 /April/2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a vast country in the Great Lakes region of 
Africa torn apart by repeated armed conflicts. As from September 1998, the conflict in the 
country attracted attention of the international community with the number of deaths 
estimated at around 3.3 million people. 
The 1998 armed conflict was the most complex in Africa, due to an intricate cluster of 
international and external factors, with up to nine states militarily involved inside the 
Congolese territory. These are grouped into two opposing sides, composed on the one side by 
the Kinshasa government with its Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean allies and on the 
other side a divided set of rebel groups composed of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la 
Démocratie (RCD) and the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) with their allies 
from Rwanda and Uganda. 
The United Nations (UN) Security Council is engaged in supporting international peace and 
security according to Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. The UN Organisation 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is a special mission sanctioned 
by the UN as an effort to solving the political problems in the DRC in line with the adoption 
of resolutions 1355 (2001), 1376 (2001), 1417 (2002), 1445 (2002), 1493 (2003), 1565 
(2004) and 1625 (2005) by the UN Security Council. It was established that MONUC 
confronted challenges of peace implementation, especially in the Eastern DRC. 
The aim of this research is to examine the role of MONUC with regard to the promotion of 
democracy and human rights in the DRC. Thus, from November 1999, MONUC started to 
operate in the Congolese peace process for the restoration of democracy, as well as the 
promotion of human rights in the country.    
This research report will demonstrate that MONUC contributed with strong political support 
towards the organisation of the 2006 national democratic elections. Meanwhile, the war was 
ended throughout the country, but human rights abuses continued to be committed in some 
Eastern areas up to date.  
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Chronology of Key Events of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 Vianney Dong, World Vision Congo communications Manager 
1
 
 
1885 King Leopold II of Belgium announces the establishment of the Congo Free 
State, headed by him. 
 
1891-92 Belgians conquer Katanga. 
 
1892-94 Eastern Congo wrested from the control of East African Arab and Swahili 
speaking traders. 
 
1908 Belgian state annexes Congo amid protests over killings and atrocities carried out 
on a mass scale by Leopold's agents. Millions of Congolese are said to have been 
killed or worked to death during Leopold's control of the territory. 
 
1955 Belgian Professor Antoin van Bilsen publishes a "30-Year Plan" for granting the 
Congo increased self-government. 
 
1959 Belgium begins to lose control over events in the Congo following serious 
nationalist riots in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). 
 
Post-Independence Turmoil 
 
1960 Jun Congo becomes independent with Patrice Lumumba as prime minister and Joseph 
Kasavubu as president. 
 
1960 Jul Congolese army mutinies; Moise Tshombe declares Katanga independent; 
Belgian troops sent in ostensibly to protect Belgian citizens and mining interests; 
UN Security Council votes to send in troops to help establish order, but the troops 
are not allowed to intervene in internal affairs. 
 
1960 Sep Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba as prime minister. 
 
1960 Dec Lumumba arrested. 
 
1961 Feb Lumumba murdered, reportedly with foreign complicity. 
 
1961 Aug UN troops begin disarming Katangese soldiers. 
 
1963 Tshombe agrees to end Katanga's secession. 
 
1964 President Kasavubu appoints Tshombe prime minister. 
 
 
                                                            
1
Dong, V, World Vision Congo Communications Manager, Timeline of Democratic Republic of Congo 
History& Key Events, http://www.larryshort.com/congo/timeline.pdf.  
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Mobutu Years 
 
1965 Kasavubu and Tshombe ousted in a coup led by Joseph Mobutu. 
 
1971 Joseph Mobutu renames the country Zaire and himself Mobutu Sese Seko; also, 
Katanga becomes Shaba and the river Congo becomes the river Zaire. 
 
1973-74 Mobutu nationalizes many foreign-owned firms and forces European investors 
out of the country. 
 
1977 Mobutu invites foreign investors back, without much success; French, Belgian 
and Moroccan troops help repulse attack on Katanga by Angolan-based rebels. 
 
1989 Zaire defaults on loans from Belgium, resulting in a cancellation of development 
programmes and increased deterioration of the economy. 
 
1990 Mobutu agrees to end the ban on multiparty politics and appoints a transitional 
government, but retains substantial powers. 
 
1991 Following riots in Kinshasa by unpaid soldiers, Mobutu agrees to a coalition 
government with opposition leaders, but retains control of the security apparatus 
and important ministries. 
 
1993 Rival pro- and anti-Mobutu governments created. 
 
1994 Mobutu agrees to the appointment of Kengo Wa Dondo, an advocate of austerity 
and free-market reforms, as prime minister. 
 
1996-97 DRC Tutsi rebels capture much of eastern Zaire while Mobutu is abroad for 
medical treatment. 
 
Aftermath of Mobutu 
 
1997 May DRC Tutsi and other anti-Mobutu rebels, aided principally by Rwanda, capture 
the capital, Kinshasa; Zaire is renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo; 
Laurent-Desire Kabila installed as president. 
 
1998 Aug Rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda rise up against Kabila and advance on 
Kinshasa. Zimbabwe, Namibia send troops to repel them. Angolan troops also 
side with Kabila. The rebels take control of much of the East of the DR Congo 
after being beaten by Kabila and his allies in the South Western part of Congo. 
 
1999 Rifts emerge between Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) rebels supported 
by Uganda and Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) rebels backed by 
Rwanda. 
 
Lusaka Peace Accord Signed 
 
1999 Jul The six African countries involved in the war sign a ceasefire accord in Lusaka. 
 
1999 Aug The MLC and RCD rebel groups sign the accord. 
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2000 UN Security Council authorises a 5,500-strong UN force to monitor the ceasefire 
but fighting continues between rebels and government forces, and between 
Rwandan and Ugandan forces. 
 
2001 Jan President Laurent Kabila is shot dead. Joseph Kabila succeeds his father. 
 
2001 Feb Kabila meets Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington. Rwanda, Uganda 
and the rebels agree to a UN pullout plan. Uganda, Rwanda begin pulling troops 
back from the frontline. 
 
2001 May US refugee agency says the war has killed 2.5 million people, directly or 
indirectly, since August 1998. Later, a UN panel says the warring parties are 
deliberately prolonging the conflict to plunder gold, diamonds, timber and coltan, 
used in the making of mobile phones. 
 
2002 Jan Eruption of Mount Nyiragongo devastates much of the city of Goma. 
 
Search for Peace 
 
2002 Apr Peace talks in South Africa: Kinshasa signs a power-sharing deal with Ugandan-
backed rebels, under which the MLC leader would be premier. Rwandan-backed 
RCD rebels reject the deal. 
 
2002 Jul Presidents of the DR Congo and Rwanda sign a peace deal under which Rwanda 
will withdraw troops from the East and the DR Congo will disarm and arrest 
Rwandan Hutu gunmen blamed for the killing of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda's 
1994 genocide. 
 
2002 Sep Presidents of the DRC and Uganda sign peace accord under which Ugandan 
troops are to leave the DRC. 
 
2002 Sep/Oct Uganda, Rwanda say they have withdrawn most of their forces from the East. 
UN sponsored power-sharing talks begin in South Africa. 
 
2002 Dec Commencement of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) in Pretoria. Rebels and 
opposition members are to be given portfolios in an interim government. 
 
Interim Government 
 
2003 Apr Signing of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement at Sun City 
 President Kabila signs a transitional constitution, under which an interim 
government will rule pending elections. 
  
2003 May Last Ugandan troops leave Eastern DR Congo. 
 
2003 Jun French soldiers arrive in Bunia, spearheading a UN-mandated rapid-reaction 
force. President Kabila names a transitional government to lead until elections in 
two years time. Leaders of main former rebel groups are sworn in as vice-
presidents in July. 
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2003 Aug Interim parliament inaugurated. 
 
2004 Mar Gunmen attack military bases in Kinshasa in an apparent coup attempt. 
 
2004 Jun Reported coup attempt by rebel guards is said to have been neutralized. 
 
2004 Dec Fighting in the East between the Congolese army and renegade soldiers from a 
former pro- Rwanda rebel group. Rwanda denies being behind the mutiny. 
 
2005 Mar UN peacekeepers say they have killed more than 50 militia members in an 
offensive, after nine Bangladeshi soldiers serving with the UN are killed in the 
Northeast. 
 
New Constitution 
 
2005 May A new constitution, with text agreed to by former warring factions, is adopted by 
parliament. 
 
2005 Sep Uganda warns that its troops may re-enter the DR Congo after a group of 
Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army rebels enter via Sudan. 
 
2005 Nov A first wave of soldiers from the former Zairian army returns after almost eight 
years of exile in the neighbouring Republic of Congo. 
 
2005 Dec Voters back the new constitution, already parliament-approved, paving the way 
for the 2006 elections. 
 
The International Court of Justice rules that Uganda must compensate the DRC 
for rights abuses and the plundering of resources in the five years up to 2003. 
 
2006 Feb The new constitution comes into force; the new national flag is adopted. 
 
2006 Mar Warlord Thomas Lubanga becomes the first war crimes suspect to face charges at 
the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He is accused of forcing children 
into active combat. 
 
2006 May Thousands are displaced in the Northeast as the army and UN peacekeepers step 
up their drive to disarm irregular forces ahead of the elections. 
 
2006 Jun Launch of official electoral campaigns in the DRC. The European Union 
approves the deployment of around 2,000 troops in DR Congo ahead of 30 July 
polls. 
 
2006 Jul First democratic elections take place.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is located in Central Africa, bordered in the 
North by the Central African Republic and Sudan; in the South by Zambia and Angola; in the 
East by Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda; and in the West by the Republic of Congo 
(Congo-Brazzaville). The DRC stretches over 2,345 square kilometres and it is the second 
largest country on the African continent after Sudan. Geographically, it also includes the 
greater part of the Congo River basin which covers an area of 400,000 square metres.
2
 The 
country lies on the Equator, with one-thirds size of it to the North and two-thirds to the South. 
The key natural resources found in the country are copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, petroleum, 
wood and hydroelectric potential. Its population is estimated at 56 million people that consist 
of more than 250 ethnic groups distinguished and named, speaking about 700 local languages 
and dialects.
3
 The language of administration is French but other intermediary languages such 
as Kikongo, Tshiluba, Swahili, and Lingala are also widely spoken. About 80% of the 
Congolese population is Christian, and predominantly Roman Catholic.
4
 The administrative 
subdivision of the country consists of eleven provinces, and the capital city is Kinshasa. 
 
Diego Cao, a Portuguese navigator, discovered the area by the river basin in 1482 and later 
on the country went through different stages of colonization. For instance in 1885, the 
country was the personal possession of the Belgian King Leopold II, but in 1907 
administration shifted from King Leopold II to the Belgian government and the country 
became Belgian Congo up until its independence on the 30 June 1960. After independence, 
Belgian Congo became a sovereign African state which was renamed Congo-Leopoldville.
5
  
 
 
                                                            
2 Kabemba, C(1), “The Democratic Republic of Congo”, in Clapham, C, Herbst, J and Mills, G (eds): Big 
African States, Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2001, p 97 
3 Ibid, p 99 
4 Missionary Atlas Project Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo (formally Zaire), 
http://worldmap.org/maps/other/profiles/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo/Republic%20of%20th
e%20Congo.pdf 
5 Radmann, W, The Nationalization of Zaire‟s Copper: From Union Miniere to GECAMINES, Indiana 
University Press, 1977 
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Rationale 
 
There are recent publications that discuss the role that the United Nations (UN) plays through 
its peacekeeping operations in relation to ending human rights abuses, wars and restoring 
human rights and democracy within the territory of a given member state. This study is a 
further exploration in this perspective. The contribution that this research is going to make to 
the academic world is to help determine a framework for preventing prolonged conflict. This 
research hopes to come up with a framework that relates to the traditional mode of UN 
peacekeeping operations and experiences by seeking to find answers about the UN 
Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) on the promotion of democracy and human 
rights in the DRC. Information from this research may well contribute to the range of existing 
International Relations theories. Thus this study hopes to shed more light and contribute to 
the understanding of the impact and support of the UN peacekeeping operations on the 
promotion of democracy and human rights by evaluating the MONUC influence in the DRC. 
With the establishment of different national institutions through elections held in 2006, the 
time has come to evaluate the results of the role of the MONUC in the country, as the DRC 
becomes progressively a law-abiding state. 
 
Aim of the study 
 
MONUC is a special mission sanctioned by the UN as part of solving the political problems 
in the DRC in line with the adoption of resolutions 1279, 1291, 1493, 1565 and 1592 by the 
UN Security Council.
6
 This research will examine the effectiveness of the MONUC mission 
in the restoration of democracy and human rights, and its impact in the DRC. The study is a 
project that seeks to document and explore the complexity of challenges faced by MONUC in 
the DRC on the one hand and on the other hand to establish its impact and the kind of support 
it has on the promotion of democracy and human rights in the DRC. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 MONUC: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo-MONUC- Mandate, www.monuc.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/mandate.html 
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Methodology 
 
Research methods and data collection  
 
The analysis will focus on the achievement of first generation rights, namely civil and 
political rights, as these are good indicators of democracy. Much of the information on first 
generation human rights will come from primary and secondary sources such as the MONUC 
reports, books, articles, academic journals and scholarly publications. In addition, this 
research will also use information from the Freedom House Index (FHI), Human Rights 
Watch and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reports 
because they systematically investigate human rights abuses around the world. They are 
reliable sources of information for investigation of human rights and democracy in the DRC.  
 
Data analysis 
 
The approach of this study will entail focusing on the implementation of first generation 
rights as an indicator of democratisation. This procedure provides a good basic standard 
framework of democracy and human rights through political rights and civil liberties in the 
DRC as the focus of this study. Furthermore, the content analysis technique will be used to 
analyze the raw data. Content analysis is a method of analysis used in qualitative research in 
which texts, documents or speech related to each other are systematically examined, specified 
and identified in emerging group themes and coded after determining and classifying 
categories.
7
  
 
Timeline 
 
This research specifically will cover data from the period starting 1999, the year of the set up 
of MONUC by the UN Security Council, up to 2006, which was the year of the first national 
democratic elections held in the DRC since independence in 1960. 
 
 
 
                                                            
7Stembler, S, An overview of content analysis, Yale University PACE Centre, 
http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=9&n=4 , 2004 
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Research structure 
 
This study comprises four chapters. The first chapter covers the concept of institutional 
liberalism in International Relations. The goal of this chapter is to build a theoretical 
framework for the analysis of peace implementation and post conflict reconstruction in the 
DRC. The second chapter traces the historical overview of the UN peacekeeping missions in 
Africa and provides background information on UN peacekeeping in Africa, as well as the 
UN mission in the DRC, its mandate and support during the Congo war. The third chapter 
analyses and discusses the transition to democracy and the role of MONUC in the DRC. It 
details the various Congolese transitional political systems toward democracy for both 
periods 1990 to 1997 and 2003 to 2006 that preceded the organisation of elections in 2006. It 
also analyses the role of MONUC and the peace implementation as well as electoral 
processes and MONUC‟s support in the DRC. The fourth chapter focuses on the 
effectiveness of MONUC with regard to democracy and human rights in the DRC. It 
highlights the impact of MONUC on the major political transition to democracy and 
evaluates MONUC impact on human rights in the DRC. Moreover, it summarizes the key 
findings of primary and secondary sources from war to peace in the DRC for more effective 
approaches to analyzing the question of whether or not the MONUC presence brought about 
democracy through elections, as well as ended the Congo wars and abuses. 
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Chapter one: CONCEPTUALIZING INSTITUTIONAL LIBERALISM 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will outline the theory of institutional liberalism taken from the discipline of 
International Relations. This is followed by a brief overview of the conceptual context of 
peacekeeping construed by an international organisation with a genuine ability for the success 
of peace operations. The chapter will emphasize how the theory is relevant to this study. In 
addition, discussions will take place on how peacekeeping as an institutional tool works 
through facilitating cooperation and mediation within a given state, relying on institutional 
liberalism theory for the clear conceptual framework of the study. Liberalism is the 
International Relations theory that is most applicable for this study as theory. Yet, liberal 
theory contains numerous strands such as sociological liberalism, interdependence liberalism, 
republican liberalism, neorealist critiques of liberalism and institutional liberalism.
8
 
Institutional liberalism is the International Relations theory which emerged after the First 
World War when the League of Nations was founded.
9
 It is also a liberalism predominate 
theory which outlines better the importance of international institutions such as 
intergovernmental organisation (IGOs) to promote cooperation and mediation between states. 
The theory focuses on the positive results of IGOs or international institutions in facilitating 
easier cooperation and negotiation.
10
  
 
1.1. Theory of institutional liberalism 
 
Institutional liberalism is a contemporary theory that emerged in liberal thought which argues 
that international organisations such as the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) or the European Union (EU) are international institutions or sets of rules that govern 
state action in particular areas.
11
 International institutions can strengthen and give support to 
cooperation between states. Institutional liberalism is the most prominent liberal 
internationalist theory explaining the way international institutions are more than mere 
                                                            
8 Jackson, R and Sorensen, G, Introduction to International Relations, Theories and approaches, Oxford 
University Press Inc, New York, 2003, p 108 
9 Ibid, p108. 
10 Ibid, pp 117-120 
11 Ibid, p 117 
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handmaidens of strong states.
12
 This means that state behaviour is restrained while actors are 
cooperating. 
 
The basic ideas of institutional liberalism in International Relations according to Robert 
Keohane are threefold: (1) “to provide a flow of information and opportunities to negotiate; 
(2) to enhance the ability of governments to monitor others‟ compliance and (3) to implement 
their own commitments hence their ability to make credible commitments in the first place; 
and strengthen prevailing expectations about the solidity of international agreements.”13 
Moreover, Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin argued that institutions provide valuable 
information by facilitating cooperation for the settlement of distributional conflicts among 
states.
14
 Indeed, following the role of institutions in International Relations, Robert Keohane 
and Lisa Martin, institutional liberalists‟ scholars, posit the importance that cooperation 
between states through international institutions is most important for addressing the 
interaction of policy environment outcomes. The theory is suitable for this research since it 
argues that “IGO‟s foster nonviolent conflict resolution and constrain the advent of 
disputes.”15 
 
In this perspective, the institutional liberalism theory recognizes international institutions like 
the UN as important organisations that facilitate mediation by promoting norms and values, 
as well as making cooperation easier by seeking harmony between and within member states 
in international relations. In addition, by playing its role, the UN contributes naturally and 
voluntarily, enabling states to achieve harmony with each other, as well as promoting 
common interests and mutual goals. Finally, through various actors, UN commitment to 
disputes resolution reduces states fear of each other.  
 
Moreover, Robert Keohane focused on the importance and the major role of international 
institutions through which states can enter into cooperation. He argues that, “international 
institutions (persistent and connected sets of rules) as both formal and informal structures that 
influence behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”16 For Keohane, the 
                                                            
12 Ibid, p 117 
13 Ibid,  p 120 
14 Keohane, R and Martin L, The promise of Institutional Theory, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, The 
MIT Press, , 1995, pp 39-51 
15 Boehmer, C, Gartzke, E and Nordstrom, T, “Do Intergovernmental Organizations promote peace?” , World 
Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, Project MUSE, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, p 1 
16 Keohane, R, “International Institutions: Two approaches”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, 
1988, p 383 
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most important function of international institutions “is to facilitate negotiations leading to 
mutually beneficial agreements among governments.”17 
 
The institutional liberalism theory suggests a form of experiential implications on 
international institutions which can vary in their impact on interstate disputes.  Adhering to 
the widely institutional liberalism theory suggests IGOs are effective at fostering harmony 
among states, because they are capable of transforming state preferences as well as promoting 
pacific global relations.
18
 Furthermore, institutional liberalism conceives that institutions or 
IGO‟s have an ability of influencing both intrastate and interstate conflicts. As a result, IGO‟s 
can be given attributes of information arbitrageur, mediator, and peacekeeping operation in 
order to overcome conflicts between states or belligerents through peace agreements. 
Institutional liberalism assumes that international institutions can be and are prominent in 
coordinating cooperation for common interests among states. Therefore, it is necessary for 
states to follow institutional liberalism pattern in order to gain more frequent cooperation. 
 
However, in practice, institutional liberalism theory to peacekeeping has revealed some 
shortcomings, such as the situation in Darfur. The Darfur experience has been problematic. 
Indeed, even when the UN has acted in the conflict, it failed to offer a way forward 
(cooperation and negotiation between belligerents). Instead of focusing on protection for the 
at risk population and facilitating cooperation, the UN responded with condemnation and 
sanctions.
19
As a result, internal conflict erupted in Sudan between Janjaweed Arab militias 
supported by the government and rebels which displaced more than 2 million people to 
neighbouring countries. Similarly, in Somalia, the UN failed to end a civil war and famine 
which killed thousands of people during the bloodiest period. Therefore, in many cases, 
peacekeeping missions did not achieve their goals. The UN failed to embrace the core 
objectives such as type and major power status of peacekeeping missions. From the above 
analyses, the evidence suggests that IGOs have no-uniform effect on states; they may both 
increase or decrease conflicts.
20
  
 
                                                            
17 Christer, J and Jonas T, Institutional Theory in International Relations: Institutional Theory in Political 
Sciences, www.statsvet.su.se/publikationer/tallberg/joensson_tallberg_institutional_theory.pdf , p 12 
18 Boehmer, C, Gartzke, E and Nordstrom, T Op Cit p 1 
19 Kuperman, A, “Rethinking the Responsibility to protect”, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and 
International Relations, www.strausscenter.org/system/uploads/4/original/Kuperman-Whitehead-R2P-2009-
final.pdf?1266510828 , 2009 
20 Boehmer, C, Gartzke, E and Nordstrom, T Op Cit p 3 
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Above all, international institutions such as the UN peacekeeping missions play a vital role in 
organizing and facilitating mediation in both intrastate and interstate conflicts. The term 
intrastate conflict in this study refers to armed conflict or civil war such as violence on 
civilians which can involve the ethno-political conflicts within the borders of a country or 
state.
21
 Viewing intrastate conflict, the Office of Women in development, a USA Agency for 
International Development stated that “intrastate conflict has deep and long-lasting effects on 
a country and its people”22 whereas, interstate conflict refers to a war between two or many 
countries. The case study is the culmination of institutional liberalism theory which considers 
the role of international institutions in both intrastate and interstate conflict. A key element of 
these analyses that relates to the impact of IGOs on dispute behaviour is the implication of 
the mandate, member cohesion and institutional structure of the peacekeeping operation for 
preventing both internal and interstate conflicts.  
 
1.2. Application of Institutional Liberalism to the DRC case study 
 
The theoretical approach outlined above contributes to the present study by establishing a 
tool for examining how an institution or IGO via a peacekeeping operation can be an 
instrument or a technique for facilitating conflict resolution between states, as well as in 
dealing with difficult conflicts inside a given state. 
 
Prominent contributions from Robert Keohane are useful as a conceptual framework and are 
relevant to this study because they explain some general ideas and key components that 
contribute to a better perception of the topic. Some of these ideas and components help to 
illustrate the theory on the role that a peacekeeping operation plays in bringing about 
democracy and human rights. 
 
According to institutional liberalists, IGOs like the UN are meant to play a central role in 
international relations by providing a flow of information and creating opportunities to 
negotiate while enhancing the ability of governments to monitor other‟s compliance with 
agreements and commitments and strengthening expectations about the cohesion or solidity 
of international agreements.
23
 Therefore IGOs in this theory can be conceptualized as the 
                                                            
21 Office of Women in Development, USA Agency for International Development, Intrastate Conflict and 
Gender, Information Bulletin no 9, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACP514.pdf, December 2000 
22 Ibid 
23Jackson, R and Sorensen, G, Op Cit pp 117-120 
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primary instruments of fixing sets of rules that specify, govern action and shape expectation 
for stable peace development.
24
 
 
The institutional liberalism perspective better informs the analysis of the intervention of 
MONUC in the DRC. Since international organisations have the ability to influence states‟ 
behaviours, the institutional liberalist approach can enhance the understanding of MONUC‟s 
role in the DRC. The theory will determine how MONUC has worked to achieve the 
transitional processes and mechanisms towards democratic elections that were politically 
possible for the DRC. MONUC is a peacekeeping mission which seeks to address democracy 
and human rights in the DRC. Once MONUC‟s role is fully understood, it becomes easier to 
evaluate point by point its impact on human rights and democracy in the DRC. By 
understanding more of the influence of MONUC, it is also easy to evaluate its impact on 
Congolese disputes through its mandate, its member cohesion as well as its structure. 
Therefore, in the interpretation of institutional liberalism used in this study, MONUC is 
simply a special mission mandated by the UN Security Council through which all belligerent 
factions, the Congolese government and countries involved in the DRC conflict negotiated 
for the implementation of peace operations in the country. Examining MONUC from Robert 
Keohane‟s contributions and comparing this analysis to the achievement of civil and political 
rights, a complete picture and representation of human rights and democracy in the DRC 
emerges.  
 
The UN framework gives MONUC (according to the UN Charter‟s Chapter VI) a number of 
ways of facilitating conflict resolution in the DRC through cooperation. This cooperation 
consists in supervising ceasefires; delivering humanitarian supplies; facilitating transition 
towards democracy; supporting the national electoral framework; and supporting the 
establishment of national human rights and rule of law based standards set by the UN with 
regards to democracy and human rights. In addition, Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives the 
UN the basis for the use of force to maintain peace and security in the DRC in order to 
achieve its mission. In my view, by clarifying Keohane‟s contributions in relation to 
MONUC, this theory can be conceptualized as a primary instrument of fixing sets of rules 
                                                            
24 Sorensen, G, Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and World Order in the 
New Millennium, 
www.fpvmv.umb.sk/fpvmv_www/phprs/storage/File/ksp/GLUN/IR_2006_3_Soerensen_liberalism_liberal_ord
er.pdf, 2006 
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that specify, govern action and shape expectation for stable peace development in the DRC.
25
 
Indeed, MONUC played a central role in the DRC by providing a flow of information and 
creating opportunities to negotiate while enhancing the ability of belligerent factions and the 
Congolese government as well as countries involved in the conflict to comply with the 
Lusaka agreement as well as strengthening their expectations about the cohesion or solidity 
of the agreement. 
 
The theoretical analysis of the present study will build upon institutional liberalism 
assumptions and the proposition that international organisation like the UN through MONUC 
can contribute to a better understanding of the concept of peacekeeping as a relevant theory 
to deal with conflicts 
 
1.3. Theory of peacekeeping 
 
The term “peacekeeping” was used for the first time after the Second World War in 1956, for 
the UN to preserve peace between states. Since that time, peacekeeping expanded 
significantly in international approaches to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations 
on the ground.
26
 Thus, from the very beginning, the UN General Assembly succeeded in 
creating the first emergency force concerning the conflicts in Egypt around the Suez canal, 
the “United Nations Emergency Force (Sinai) I” (UNEF I).27 It was organized to monitor the 
withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from the Suez Canal.
28
 However, the peace 
operation seeking ways for preventing conflict in the Suez Canal faced several challenges 
which led the UN General Assembly to set up a new policy to deal with such matters. In this 
perspective, the SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACEKEEPING was created in the Suez 
crisis. Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, described peacekeeping as 
belonging to "Chapter Six and a Half of the Charter”.29 In his view, “peacekeeping is placed 
between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as negotiation and 
mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII”.30 
 
                                                            
25 Ibid. 
26 United Nations Information Service, 60 years of United Nations Peacekeeping: Looking back/Moving 
forward, Vienna International Centre, www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/60years_peacekeeping.pdf, May 2008, p 1 
27 Rikhye, I, The theory and practice of peacekeeping, published for the International Peace Academy by C. 
HURST & Company, London, 1984, p 2 
28 Ibid,  p 2 
29 United Nations Information Service, Op Cit p 3 
30 Ibid,  p 3 
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It is also imperative to remind ourselves that peacekeeping should be differentiated from 
peace building while the two take place concomitantly. Peacekeeping is defined as “the 
deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the 
parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and 
frequently civilians as well. It is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the 
prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”31 
 
A fundamental aim of any peacekeeping action or operation is to influence through its 
presence belligerent factions in conflict to bring them together in a sustained peace process. 
UN peacekeeping has the responsibility, according to its different types of activities, in 
ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security through monitoring the cease-
fire agreement, involving arms-control verification, human rights monitoring, election 
supervision, facilitating transitional politic governments, implementing disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration programmes and improving human conditions for 
sustainable peace.
32
 For the success of international peace, peacekeeping is one of the conflict 
resolution procedures which allow the UN to be represented in the field by deploying 
personnel and military with the consent of belligerent parties in order to separate them for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace. 
 
According to Ciobanu, the concept of peacekeeping therefore should be understood in its 
stricto sensu concept which explains peacekeeping as those operations which are carried out 
by organized armed forces of the United Nations acting, as a rule, with the cooperation of the 
parties involved in political or military conflict.
33
 Relying on the stricto sensu concept of 
peacekeeping given by Ciobanu, it is important to emphasize that peacekeeping operations 
within the UN framework always influence and provide a forum for negotiations to 
belligerent parties in international conflict. As a result, peacekeeping operations include the 
deployment of a UN military presence on the ground with the consent of all belligerent 
parties to the conflict and its mandate depends on its nature. According to its mandate, the 
                                                            
31 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Secretary 
Council on 31 January 1992, An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking and peacekeeping, 
www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf, A/47/277-S/24111, June 1992 
32 Serafini, M, N, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Division, Peacekeeping and Related Stability operations: 
Issues of US Military Involvement, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IB94040.pdf, 
May 2006 
33Ciobanu, D, “The power of the Security Council to organize peacekeeping operations” in Cassese, A ,United 
Nations Peacekeeping : Legal Essays, Alpena an den Rijn- the Netherlands, 1978, p 15      
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peacekeeping operation should be neutral and impartial toward belligerent parties to the 
conflict and it is subordinated to the leadership of the UN. 
 
Since the establishment of peacekeeping, the UN has involved into more varied peacekeeping 
operations than it had in the era of the Cold War. On the one side is classical/traditional 
peacekeeping classified as the first generation of peacekeeping and on the other side is 
multidimensional peacekeeping classified as the second generation of peacekeeping. UN 
peacekeeping has considerably changed during this progression. Different changes have 
happened in order to adapt peacekeeping missions according to situations found on the field 
which required the UN to continue its operations with new and remarkable guidelines to 
make them more effective and efficient. 
 
1.3.1 First generation peacekeeping not in the UN Charter: The Secretary General 
Dag Hammarskjöld and General Assembly President Lester Pearson principles 
 
The first generation described as classical/traditional model of peacekeeping missions was 
deployed soon after the Second World War with the mandate to ensure international peace 
and security. Traditional peacekeeping gave impartial and neutral guarantees to belligerent 
factions in conflict that desired to engage in a ceasefire apart from the United States and 
Soviet Union intervention.
34
 For instance, in the 1956 Suez crisis mentioned above, though 
the UNEF I was not part of the UN Charter, it was an important UN mission that was 
considered a success. The mission was established to be a set of principles and valuable 
guidelines for future UN peacekeeping missions by the Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld 
and the General Assembly President Lester Pearson.
35
 In that mission, the UN deployed 
troops in response to the war in the Sinai Peninsula. Moreover, the UN engaged in the war 
without the participation of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Other examples 
which saw such UN missions are the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Indo-Pakistani war over 
Kashmir. Both situations sufficiently demonstrated efficient and effective ways used by the 
UN without the participation of the two superpowers of that time by providing a buffer zone 
between the parties to the conflict. Those missions are known as the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India 
                                                            
34Karns, M, “ The United Nations at 60 and the future of its peacekeeping role” in Le Pere, G and Samasuwo, N, 
The UN at 60: A new spin on old hub, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, South Africa, 2006, p 136 
35 Hansen, W, Rambothan, O and Woodhouse, T, Hawks and Doves: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, 
Research Centre for Constructive conflict management,  www.berghof-
handbook.net/documents/publications/hansen_etal_handbook.pdf, 2004 p 3  
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and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The missions had specific mandates of monitoring ceasefires and 
reporting on the situation in both countries. In first generation peacekeeping, most of the 
UN‟s interventions were limited in means as well as in number and scope as to the mandate 
set up strictly according to the role of monitoring the situation. As a consequence, while 
certain rare missions created situations of peace, most among them were not able to resolve 
conflicts due to the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the 
time of the Cold War. Generally, first generation peacekeeping operations were often 
constituted of small military personnel groups, lightly armed and often stationed between 
antagonistic forces to observe ceasefires and troop withdrawals.
36
 UN troops were not 
authorized to use force. Moreover, the contingent of peacekeepers was composed by 
personnel coming from many different countries and all peacekeeping operations were under 
the Secretary General‟s control.37  
 
1.3.2. Second generation peacekeeping 
 
Second generation of peacekeeping known as a multidimensional peacekeeping begins 
around 1990. Much of these missions such as the UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC), the 
UN in Somalia (UNOSOM), the UN mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the UN in the 
former Yugoslavia were the largest and most complex missions in the world and were 
involved with internal conflict resolution and peace building.
38
 These operations were the 
first examples of multidimensional peacekeeping missions. Some of these operations had a 
main task of supervising ceasefires within member states, delivering humanitarian aids, 
helping political transitions of states for the observation of democracy, conducting election 
processes and building institutions during the post conflict period.
39
  
 
Second generation peacekeeping is also illustrated when the UN becomes involved in civil 
wars or interstate conflicts in order to help countries in conflicts to reach the level of 
sustainable peace through negotiations. The multidimensional peacekeeping model carries 
out multiple functions by combining different types of tasks.  Generally, peacekeeping 
operations are often constituted by both civilian and military personnel groups heavily armed 
to use force to defend their security in case of militia violence against them. In addition, the 
                                                            
36 Karms, M, Op Cit, p 136 
37 Hansen, W, Rambothan, O and Woodhouse, T, Op Cit, p 3 
38Brahm, E, Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), www.beyondintractability.org/essay/role_igo/?nid=1328, 
2005 
39 Ibid 
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composition of the civilian and military personnel groups is from developed nations which 
provide as well financial means to peacekeepers for the success of their mandate.
40
 
 
From the above, the concept and evolution of peacekeeping might be discussed as a most 
fundamental component to the study of IGOs as they are major instruments for sustainable 
peace. Furthermore, through a peacekeeping operation, IGOs offer forums for discussions 
which facilitate cooperation in internal and external conflicts. In accordance to peacekeeping 
principles concerning different models of missions, particularly multidimensional 
peacekeeping operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno an Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations  argues that “beyond simply monitoring ceasefires, peacekeeping 
operations are often mandated to a catalytic role such as (1) Disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) of combatants; (2) Mine action (3) Security Sector Reform (SSR) and 
other rule of Law-related activities; (4) Protection and promotion of human rights; (5) 
Electoral assistance; and (6) Support to the restoration and extension of state authority.”41 
 
Following the catalytic role of multidimensional peacekeeping missions in the sustainability 
of peace, democracy and promotion of human rights, they appear to be key components that 
help to determine whether or not a country is democratic as well as its observance of national 
human rights for a better understanding about the topic under scrutiny.  
 
1.4. Democracy and promotion of human rights 
 
The organization of good democratic governance is always characterised by elections. 
Democracy is a political system in which political leaders are determined through elections 
and are responsible and accountable to the people who elected them.
42
 Thus, both the 
democratic process and the political system help make certain that the elected government is 
responsible and always under popular control. Such social mechanisms based on debates 
provide on the one side regular constitutional opportunities for alteration of the governing 
                                                            
40 A Paramount Group White Paper, UN Member States Responsibility towards Peacekeeping Developments, 
www.paramountgroup.biz/uploads/assets/files/Whitepapers/11-un-member-states-responsibility-towards-
peacekeeping-deployments.pdf, June 2009, pp 1-9 
41 Guehenno, J, The evolution of peacekeeping: Part I, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section Division of Policy, 
Evaluation and Training Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations Secretariat, New York, 10017, 
www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf , March 2008. 
42 Shabbir, C, G, Democracy and development: A conceptual framework, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan005781.pdf, p 17 
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officials, and the setting of a system founded on the rule of law between the elected and their 
representatives on the other side. Those mechanisms are guaranteed procedures to protect 
majority rule and minority rights. Furthermore, the organisation of elections in a given 
country is not enough to consider that country as a democratic entity. In reality, it is the 
technique and the quality of elections which could determine if the country is or is not 
democratic. Therefore, the technique and the quality of elections involves various principles 
such as multi-party elections, high participation of different organisations, frequency of 
elections, and acknowledgment of election results by the opposition.
43
 Also the transparency 
of the conduct of electoral process by the electoral commission should be based on universal 
standards.
44
 
 
Democracy and human rights go together and are connected to one another. Indeed, every 
person who lives has been granted a safeguarded privilege which is known as inalienable 
rights. Human rights are rights given to any human being that can be exercised and enforced 
under a set of grounds or justifications without interference from others.
45
 From these rights, 
any human being should feel free to think, develop and to work, to speak and to participate 
without being intimidated or exploited. Human rights obligations are indivisible and have 
been classified into threefold typology as follows: civil rights, political rights, and social and 
economic rights.
46
 Putting together all types of human rights are essential in human beings‟ 
lives. As mentioned above, democracy is connected to human rights and as a result, various 
features of democracy are usually informed by human rights and especially civil rights such 
as freedom of speech, faith, opinion and expression which promote the right to political 
participation. In terms of political rights, these include the right to form and join any political 
parties, while the right to peaceful assembly and association is paramount. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
43 Ibid,  p 17     
44 Cohen, R, Hyden, G and Nagan, W, Human Rights and Governance in Africa, University Press of Florida, 
1993, p 4 
45 Ibid, p 4 
46 Zerha, F, Democracy and human rights in developing countries, Lynner Rienner Publishers Inc, USA, 1991, 
p3  
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Conclusion 
 
Any effort to analyse how MONUC attempted to bring about democracy through elections as 
well as ending the Congo wars and abuses should take into account the assumptions of 
institutional liberalism which drives this study. In taking Robert Keohane‟s contributions, 
institutional liberalism is an adequate framework of analysis.  The conceptual framework 
proposed outlines the role and influence that the presence of MONUC has in the level of 
conforming the DRC to democracy and human rights standards. 
 
Having said this, institutional liberalism helps to shape discussions of actors involved in 
conflict by promoting norms and values, as well as facilitating their cooperation. Through 
formalised agreements coordinated by the UN, this procedure facilitates the coordination of 
MONUC in the Congolese conflict via the UN mechanisms. These processes along with 
Chapter VI and VII dispositions of the UN Charter are a comprehensive diplomatic process 
within the conflict resolution framework that facilitates mediation and negotiation through 
MONUC in the DRC. Institutional liberalism theory facilitates the understanding of 
MONUC‟s role regarding the promotion of democracy and human rights in the DRC which 
results in a correct and highly adequate analysis of the period 1999-2006. Institutional 
liberalism admits the implication of institutions or IGOs during the time of interstate or 
internal conflicts.  
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Chapter two:  THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA AND    
                         THE DRC CONTEXT: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW      
                         
 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an historical overview of the UN peacekeeping missions undertaken in 
Africa and in the DRC with specific reference to their mandates. Most of them involved 
deployment of troops and made Africa the most important area in the world for the 
peacekeeping operations of the UN. In Africa, peacekeeping missions have been of multiple 
types. On the one side several of these operations such as those in Angola, Somalia, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Rwanda have been the most significant projects 
of the UN in peacekeeping missions and conflict resolutions while on the other side, some of 
these missions involved the UN‟s role of monitoring and supervising elections such as in 
South Africa‟s first democratic elections in 1994. 
 
Since 1960, the UN Security Council has deployed more than 18 peacekeeping missions in 
Africa. Approximately half of UN peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era have been 
in Africa, making the continent a giant laboratory for UN peacekeeping in the world.
47
 It has 
been demonstrated that of all the UN peacekeeping missions that the UN Security Council 
has mandated in Africa, a high number of them have been in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
An assessment of the above evidence should therefore be facilitated by an historical overview 
of five important UN peacekeeping missions selected among others undertaken in Africa. 
 
2.1.  UN peacekeeping missions in Africa 
 
The UN has faced many problems and difficulties of peacekeeping in Africa because of its 
peculiar political context. In the UN Charter there is no provision for peacekeeping. The 
threat against peace guides the UN to be better positioned in order to deal with regional 
conflicts between the peaceful settlements provisions of Chapter VI on one hand, and on the 
                                                            
47 Adebajo, A, “From Congo to Sudan: UN peacekeeping in Africa 1”, in Le Pere, G and Samasuwo, N The UN 
at 60: Anew spin on old hub, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, South Africa, 2006, p 265 
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other hand the military enforcement provisions of Chapter VII.
48
  As a result, peacekeeping 
operations are often authorised according to the urgent situation on the ground, which makes 
the UN an experienced actor in pursuing efforts for peace settlement in worldwide 
multidimensional conflicts in general and for Africa in particular. 
 
The above point is clearly illustrated by Chapter VII of the UN Charter that authorizes the 
UN to deal with any issue that presents a threat to international peace and security (wars, 
violence within states and humanitarian crisis). This assertion leads the UN to take actions 
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression that make it 
possible for the UN to engage in a number of internal conflicts on regional levels. 
 
Based on a thorough consideration of peacekeeping in Africa, the five most important 
operations were those in Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda and Somalia. The 
experiences by the UN in African peacekeeping in these different countries will help to draw 
some conclusions about the presence of MONUC in the DRC in order to achieve a peaceful 
settlement, for the reduction of the level of conflict in the country. 
 
2.1.1.  Mozambique 
 
In Mozambique, the civil war was one of the most chaotic and vicious types of conflict that 
ever plagued modern Africa at that time. The number of internal parties to the conflict 
plunged the country into brutal civil wars between 1975 and 1990. The international 
community, disturbed by the situation on the ground, played a decisive role in order to end 
Mozambique‟s wars. Several countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi and 
others in the region had a central place in peacemaking during the year 1989. 
 
In 1990, with the end of the Cold War, a UN peacekeeping mission was installed in 
Mozambique to end the war. In 1992, the UN Security Council adopted the UN Mission in 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ). According to its mandate, the main responsibility of ONUMOZ 
was to monitor the ceasefire, to carry out disarmament and demobilisation, to facilitate the 
                                                            
48Karns, M , Op Cit, p 135 
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return of two million refugees from neighbouring countries, to oversee the coordination of 
humanitarian assistance and verify national elections.
49
 
 
Once established, ONUMOZ played the mediation role by assuming a core coordinating 
position which led the mission to eventual success. The successes included among others: the 
disarmament and mobilisation of 64,130 Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) 
and 22,637 Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) fighters between January and 
August 1994. Eventually 1,200 UN electoral observers oversaw parliamentary and 
presidential elections in October 1994 in which FRELIMO won.
50
 
 
To ensure success of the peacekeeping operation in Mozambique, the UN deployed nearly 
6,000 peacekeepers, 130 civilian police and the mission cost $ 332 million a year.
51
 
 
2.1.2. Angola 
 
Since 1975, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and Unaio Nacional 
Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) were fighting and the conflict engaged the 
country in a civil war.  As a consequence of the war, on the one side, the MPLA was able to 
secure the capital Luanda with the help of about 50,000 Cuban troops, while UNITA, with 
the help of another political party, Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), 
succeeded to enter into an alliance with South Africa, the United States of America, France 
and Zaïre (DRC).
52
 The situation on the ground attracted attention from the international 
community which led to external mediation for lasting peace. 
 
The UN involvement was expressed through different distinct missions as follows: 
The first UN mission was established in December 1988. The UN Angola Verification 
Mission (UNAVEM I) had the main goal of verifying the withdrawal of Cuban troops from 
Angola. The implementation culminated in the 1991 MPLA and UNITA peace accord.  The 
agreement called on the one side for the cessation of all foreign military support to both sides, 
for troops to be disarmed and demobilised, for a national army to be created, and for multi-
party elections to be held. On the other side, the agreement as well called for the 
                                                            
49 Adekeye, A and Landsberg, C, Back to the future: UN peacekeeping in Africa, EBSCO Publishing, 2002, p 
168 
50 Ibid, p 168 
51 Ibid, p 168  
52 Ibid, p 168  
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establishment of a joint political-military commission, with the participation of the US, the 
Soviet Union and Portugal.
53
  The mission cost $ 19 million and achieved its task by June 
1991. 
 
The second UN mission was established in the same month of June 1991. The Security 
Council approved UNAVEM II, mandated to verify the implementation of the peace accord 
which had been signed between the MPLA and UNITA. The peace accord had collapsed 
because of the refusal of UNITA to accept the election results which returned the country into 
civil war causing more deaths. The mission had about 700 peacekeepers and cost 
approximately $ 118, 000.
54
 
 
The third UN mission was established in November 1994 after the signing of the Lusaka 
protocol. UNAVEM III was mandated to implement the Lusaka protocol. In this particular 
mission, the UN increased the number of the peacekeeping force to some 7,000 peacekeepers 
which allowed the Security Council, during different phases of the peace process, to 
incorporate and integrate UNITA into the transitional government and national army in 
Luanda.
55
 
 
 The UN peacekeeping operations in Angola went through extraordinary difficulties such as 
the denial of UNITA to recognise the democratic elections as well as the government. 
 
2.1.3. Rwanda 
 
The civil war erupted in 1990, when the Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army (RPF) invaded the 
country from Uganda. This militia group was mostly composed by Rwanda‟s Tutsi minority 
who had been forced to go in exile during the Hutu dominated government. As a consequence 
of the war, on the one side, Uganda entered into alliance with Tutsi exiles while on the other 
side, France and Zaire (DRC) sent military troops in order to support the Hutu government of 
Rwanda. 
 
In 1993, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) arranged peace talks in Arusha. The peace 
settlement under international mediation between the Hutu dominated government and the 
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Tutsi exiles movement stipulated the creation of a transitional national government. The 
transitional government should include all political groups (i.e. power sharing) as mentioned 
in the agreement signed by both the Hutu government and the Tutsi exiles movement. 
Furthermore, it foresaw the establishment of a national army respecting equality between 
Hutu and Tutsi, as well as the demobilisation of different army factions. The Arusha 
agreement led the Security Council to the establishment of a UN Assistance Mission in 
Rwanda (UNAMIR). UNAMIR had a multifaceted mandate divided into four phases with 
main objectives of implementing the agreement, notably to assure and guarantee the overall 
security of Rwanda and to disarm all remaining fighters.
56
 
 
In 1994, a plane carrying the Rwandese president Habyarimana was shot at and felled by 
suspected government rebels. The assassination of the president led to the start of the 
genocide against the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus. All the atrocities were planned by a 
group of extremist Hutus, the members of the Hutu power ideology, officers of the 
presidential guard, the interahamwe and impuzamungambi Hutu militias as well as by 
members of the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), all “extremists Hutus”.57 
 
The Rwandese genocide claimed around 800,000 lives of Tutsi people and plunged the 
country into civil war. The RPF military took power during the time of the persistence of 
civil war. As a result of the war, over 250,000 Rwandese Tutsi fled into neighbouring 
countries as refugees while about one million of the Hutu populations fled into Eastern parts 
of the DRC.
58
 Later on in 1994, the Security Council established UNAMIR II which 
constituted 5,500 peacekeepers who had the mandate of saving and protecting victims of 
genocide. UNAMIR II significantly enlarged its mandate in helping as well as mediating in 
the relations between the RPF military as the new government and the international 
community. In 1996, the UN troops were withdrawn from the country. The UN peacekeeping 
operations in Rwanda cost around $ 120 million per year.
59
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2.1.4. Somalia 
 
Thirty years after its independence, Somalia was embroiled in civil war in 1991. The country 
was divided in different parts such as the separatist temptations to the north, the hegemonic 
tribal dreams in the capital Mogadishu around President Siad Barre, and the military 
rebellions to the south. As a result, the country sunk into brutal tribal wars. In 1991, the civil 
conflict led to opposition parties taking an option of running militia armies which produced a 
humanitarian disaster in the country. The situation attracted the international community‟s 
attention. Amnesty International for instance accused military armies of massacring one 
million of disarmed civilians. International actions in favour of the civil population finally 
brought the Security Council to envisage urgently the organisation of a humanitarian corridor 
for the distribution of aid.
60
 
 
The deployment of UN troops constituted an international force in which multinational forces 
operated under the Security Council, the organ for maintaining and re-establishing peace and 
international security. In Somalia‟s case, the UN had given to its mission strict objective 
based on humanitarian assistance such as facilitating humanitarian aid to the population, 
refugees and prisoners trapped by famine. Consequently, in 1992 it was agreed that an 
important UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) would be deployed at four centres in the 
country with a mandate to ensure distribution of humanitarian aid.
61
 Furthermore, UNOSOM 
expanded its mandate to help stop the conflict with the objective of restoring the fundamental 
political institutions such as the authority of the state. However, UNOSOM„s action was 
insufficient to stop the humanitarian disaster in Somalia. In order to help UNOSOM‟s 
operation, the United Task Force (UNITAF), a United States initiative was created according 
to Chapter VII of the Charter under Security Council‟s resolution 814 for the protection of 
the environment in which humanitarian aid should be conducted in the southern half of 
Somalia.
62
 
 
Apart from the protection of the environment for humanitarian aid, UNITAF also had the 
main task of disarming and dispersing the militias. During a period of six months from the 
beginning of its mission, UNITAF did not properly fulfil its objective through any successful 
intervention. As a result, in 1993 the Secretary-General of the UN submitted some 
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recommendations to the Security Council to relieve UNITAF of its responsibility for 
peacekeeping functions.
63
 
 
As mentioned above, the Security Council approved the mandate of UNOSOM II in 
resolution 814(1993) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mandate covered the entire 
country and was required to monitor all factions to ensure they continued to respect the 
cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they had consented. They were also 
tasked with preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate 
action and to maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions. 
Furthermore, UNOSOM II, a special UN mission under international control, was mandated 
to undertake specific tasks such as seizing the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements;  
securing all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance; protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the United 
Nations and its agencies, the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) as well as other 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and continuing mine-clearing, and repatriating 
refugees and displaced persons within Somalia.
64
 Under resolution 814, the essential mission 
entrusted to UNOSOM II seemed to be more political than humanitarian while the economic 
sector remained destroyed. 
 
The UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia faced immense difficulties in trying to reach an 
agreement between belligerent factions through mediation. Also the peacekeeping force 
failed to disarm the major combatants in the country. Thus the country began to sink further 
into tribal wars. 
 
2.1.5. Namibia 
 
In Namibia the independence struggle by resistance groups plunged the country into war. As 
a result, the principal political and racial resistance group, the South West African People‟s 
Organisation (SWAPO), and South African forces were engaged in a prolonged civil war 
before 1980. During the time of the long fighting between South African forces and SWAPO, 
several people perished, a number of political actors run away into exile and others were 
incarcerated as political prisoners. In 1989, the UN facilitated the peace settlement plan in 
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Namibia for securing its independence. As a result, the Security Council approved a UN 
operation in Namibia, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), mandated to 
undertake the tasks of supervising the ceasefire between South African and SWAPO forces; 
monitoring the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and the confinement of 
SWAPO forces to a series of bases; supervising the civil police force; securing the repeal of 
discriminatory and restrictive legation; arranging for the release of political prisoners and the 
return of exiles; and creating conditions for free and fair elections.
65
 
 
UNTAG included both a civilian and military component provided by different countries but 
it played a fundamental role as a mediator in supervising the peace process. The UN 
peacekeeping operation in Namibia was a huge success because it was able to complete its 
mandate in time. 
 
2.1.6. Analysis 
 
These five cases of UN peacekeeping present a number of UN missions in intrastate conflicts 
of various types in Africa. There is a need to establish a comparison of those missions to 
MONUC in order to offer essential lessons for the perspective of this study. All peacekeeping 
operations mentioned above have intervened in cases of civil war. 
 
 Assessing the evolution of peacekeeping especially in Africa, Margaret Karns argued that 
“peacekeeping missions involving (1) arms-control verification, (2) human rights monitoring, 
and (3) election supervision tend to be successful and are most similar to traditional 
peacekeeping.”66 Therefore, for Karns, these three factors together constitute the way of 
success for peacekeeping operations in Africa.  
 
Adebajo on the other hand gives six factors that often contribute to the success of 
peacekeeping operations in Africa. Those factors are: “(1) The willingness of internal parties 
to disarm and accept electoral results; (2) the development of an effective strategy to deal 
with potential spoilers who are prepared to use violence to wreck peace process; (3) the 
absence of conflict-fuelling economic resources in war zones; (4) the cooperation of regional 
players in peace processes; (5) the cessation of military and financial and diplomatic support 
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to peace processes; and (6) the leadership of peacekeeping missions by capable UN 
envoys.”67 
 
Karns and Adekeye‟s views on peacekeeping are based on a series of peacekeeping 
experiences in Africa. Moreover, the factors they list have probably determined whether or 
not peacekeeping missions succeeded in each case. 
 
Based on Karns and Adekeye‟s arguments on the factors which have most contributed to 
success in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, it is important to note that only two cases 
were identified as having been hugely successful. Indeed, UN peacekeeping operations in 
Namibia and Mozambique met all the factors for success. Those peacekeeping operations 
succeeded because peacekeepers achieved brilliant work in facilitating elections. In addition, 
the mediation role played by UN peacekeepers in both countries provided resolutions for 
military issues throughout ceasefires as well as the disarmament and demobilisation of militia 
factions. The UN took the lead in negotiating peace agreements which have been correctly 
implemented. The outcomes confirmed that the antagonistic parties to the conflicts were 
willing to cooperate with the peace process and have accepted electoral results. Some 
peacekeeping operations have succeeded, while many have failed to deal with the internal 
conflicts. 
 
On the negative side, the case of Somalia challenged the impartiality of peacekeeping which 
is contrary to the wider concept of peacekeeping missions. UNOSOM with its main goal to 
ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid was transformed into a vulgar colonial police on 
the ground. As a result, some hundreds of civilians were killed under a pretext of capturing 
general Aidid. The situation decreased the UN‟s capacity to take over peacekeeping duties. 
Nevertheless, the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia succeeded in its goal of delivering 
humanitarian aid, and failed in its goal as pacificator of the nation. Belligerent parties were 
reluctant for negotiations that would culminate in the sharing of power. While being the best-
equipped soldiers in the world, it is important to note that UNOSOM II was a spectacular 
failure because it did not achieve its tasks. The outcome remains in doubt and the case 
illustrates that the deployment of UN troops in order to facilitate humanitarian aid to the 
population trapped by famine were too little and too late to save thousands of human lives. 
The UN mission in Somalia did not meet any one of its objectives for success. 
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In the case of Angola, the peacekeeping operation became involved in peace agreement 
negotiations.  The outcome was indecisive due to the fact that Jonas Savimbi the leader of 
UNITA refused to disarm and to accept national elections results. As a consequence, the 
accords under the leadership of UNAVEM have not been totally implemented and UN troops 
have been withdrawn from the country. The UN mission in Angola was deficient in a certain 
number of factors. Likewise, in Rwanda, the UN peacekeeping operation failed its goal due 
to certain conditions on the ground. The fact that the UN mission lacked political strategies 
and financial means obliged the Security Council to withdraw blue-helmets from Rwanda. As 
a result, the UN mission was very small and not able to intervene in time to save the 
Rwandese from genocide. The genocidal regime was installed and many Rwandese parties 
were not part of the national government. The UN mission in Rwanda failed and did not meet 
any factor for success. 
 
2.2.  The DRC and background to the UN mission 
 
MONUC in the DRC is the largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission in the world. It 
has faced many challenges in accomplishing its mandate. Despite its efforts for maintaining 
the ceasefires on one hand and one the other hand its support to the transitional government 
and to national elections held in 2006, peace in the country is still fragile. The mission 
struggled to maintain peace and security and is still lacking in a certain number of factors for 
its success. This is despite MONUC having gone further than each of the preceding 
peacekeeping missions with a broader mandate than any of them. 
 
2.2.1. Wars and conflicts in the DRC 
 
Since the independence of the DRC, several events have destabilized the country including: 
secessions, wars and changes in the political systems of rule. In 1965, Mobutu seized control 
of the country by proclaiming himself president for five years and centralizing power, 
establishing a dictatorship in the process. 
 
Around 1990, at the height of the Cold War, Mobutu was weakened by external and internal 
pressures, coupled with heightened international criticism of his regime and a series of 
domestic protests. In 1992, the Sovereign National Conference, which was organized to 
encompass more than 2,000 representatives from different political parties, elected Etienne 
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Tshisekedi, leader of opposition parties and of the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès 
social (UDPS), as prime minister. During the conference, presidential and legislative 
elections were scheduled and rescheduled repeatedly for over a period of two years, but they 
never took place. By 1994, the war and genocide began in Rwanda. This situation affected 
the DRC especially in its Eastern part where Rwandese Hutu militia forces of Interhamwe, 
who had fled from Rwanda, erected their camps as bases for incursions against the new 
Rwandese Tutsi government. Later on in October the same year, Laurent Kabila, known as 
the leader of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), 
formed a military coalition with Rwandese and Ugandan troops and entered Congo with the 
sole purpose of forcibly ousting Mobutu through a military campaign towards Kinshasa. On 
May 17, 1997 Mobutu left power, and Kabila seized control of the country, declaring himself 
president as he consolidated power around himself, the Rwandese and the AFDL. In fact, 
when Kabila took over, the army chief and the Secretary General of the AFDL were both 
Rwandese. One year later, relations between Laurent Kabila and the other parts involved in 
his fragile coalition deteriorated as he ordered all foreign troops to leave the DRC. Rwandese 
troops refused to leave the country and on 2 August 1998 fighting erupted throughout the 
DRC and once again Rwandese troops entered the country with the intention of removing 
Kabila from power using the newly formed Rwandese rebel group called the Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD). They established themselves in Goma and controlled 
large portions of the Eastern DRC. In February 1999, Ugandan troops entered into the 
country with a rebel group called the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC), which 
established control over a third of the Northern part of the country. At this stage, the DRC 
was divided de facto into three segments: one for the government, the other one for 
Rwandese and the RCD, and the last one for Ugandan and the MLC. 
 
Probably the 1998 war was not in the beginning a rebellion, but a foreign attack that 
converted itself into an insurrection.
68
 As in any conflict of this magnitude, massacres, human 
rights violations, lootings, bombing of civilian targets were common practices in the Eastern 
DRC, from both the rebels and government forces. Around 700,000 people were either 
displaced or missing, many among them were victims of reprisals and persecution, and 
thousands were dead. Some 80,000 others decided to leave the battle zone to seek refuge in 
neighboring countries and approximately 2.5 million people were displaced persons by the 
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end of 2002.
69
 Since 1998, the conflict in the DRC has caused a death toll of 3.3 million 
people, meaning it has cost more lives than any other conflict since the Second World War.
70
 
In January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated and succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila 
who reversed many policies of his father. This allowed MONUC to deploy its troops 
throughout the country and the proceeding of the inter-Congolese dialogue. On July 30, 2006 
the DRC held its first free, democratic, multi-party elections in more than forty years and 
Joseph Kabila was elected as president of the country. 
 
2.2.2. MONUC: A UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC context 
 
This subsection will focus on the UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC in the period1999-
2006. Nevertheless, a historical background of MONUC is fundamental to know the context 
of the UN mission in the DRC especially how it works and why it exists.  
 
The DRC is a vast country in the great lakes region of Africa torn apart by repeated armed 
conflicts. As from September 1998, the conflict in the DRC attracted the attention of the 
international community with the number of deaths estimated at around 3.3 million people. 
The 1998 armed conflict in the DRC was the most complex in Africa, due to an intricate 
cluster of internal and external factors, with up to nine states militarily involved inside 
Congolese territory.  Grouped in two opposing sides, composed on the one side by the 
Kinshasa government with its Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean allies and on the other 
side divided sets of rebel groups composed of the RCD and the MLC with their allies 
Rwanda and Uganda.  After great pressure was placed on the belligerents by the international 
community, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Lusaka by the different governments and 
representatives of both factions involved in the conflict. The agreement was called the 
“Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement” and was concluded in July and August 1999.71 In the Lusaka 
agreement, apart from the clause on the cessation of hostilities and a political settlement 
among the Congolese parties, it also defined in its Chapter V the parameters of the Inter-
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Congolese Dialogue, understood as an international process to negotiations. The aim of those 
negotiations was to facilitate the country towards a new political period and national 
reconciliation process through a transitional administration related to power sharing such as 
the formation of a new Congolese army; the future institutions of the country; the 
organisation of general elections; and the interim constitution that would govern the DRC 
during the transition period.
72
 The Security Council deployed the MONUC operation to the 
DRC in November 1999 to support the ceasefire by containing the various rebel groups in 
their initial positions and to create conditions where free and fair elections would be held. 
MONUC‟s international commitment to peace as a special mission in the DRC is established 
by the UN Security Council through the approval of different resolutions: 1258 and 1279 in 
1999; 1291 in 2000; 1355 and 1376 in 2001; 1445 in 2002; 1493 in 2003; 1565 and 1635 in 
2004; 1635 and 1671 in 2005, in order to monitor the peace process subsequently to the 1998 
conflict in the DRC.
73
 
 
The first deployments of UN officers to the DRC under Security Council resolutions 1258 
and 1279 in 1999 had specific missions of facilitating the observation of the ceasefire by all 
armed groups in the country in order to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and 
displaced people as well as human rights protection to all affected persons.
74
 
 
In 2000, the UN Security Council under resolution 1291 approved the deployment of 5537 
military personnel. The main goal of the operation was to monitor the implementation of the 
ceasefire agreement and the redeployment of belligerent forces; to develop an action plan for 
the overall implementation of the ceasefire agreement; to work with parties to obtain the 
release of all prisoners of war, military captives and the return of the remains; to facilitate 
humanitarian assistance; and to assist the facilitator of the national dialogue.
75
 
 
MONUC eventually took the necessary action according to the UN Security Council 
resolution in the areas of deployment in ensuring the security of equipment and the protection 
of both its personnel and civilians under physical assaults. In addition, the application of a 
ceasefire was not effective due to the violent fighting in the Katanga and Equateur provinces, 
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as well as in Kisangani by foreign troops. Therefore, MONUC actions were impossible 
because of the insecurity found in the areas of deployment. 
 
By 2001, MONUC troops were strengthened with 2366 soldiers and 363 more military- 
observers who came from different countries such as South Africa, Uruguay, Morocco, 
Senegal and Tunisia and were authorized to monitor the disengagement of different forces to 
the conflict and the withdrawal of the Rwandese and Ugandan forces from DRC territory.  
The UN troops in their positions faced several difficulties for protecting the civilian 
population and even MONUC personnel from the violent fighting in areas in the East of the 
DRC. Following difficulties experienced by UN observers and troops in the deployment 
areas, the Security Council voted for resolution 1355, giving MONUC the capacity of 
disarmament, demobilisation, and repatriation and reintegration process of the militia 
groups.
76
 The achievement of MONUC‟s mission with regards to the above process led the 
Security Council to vote for resolution 1376 allowing the deployment of MONUC troops in 
all the Eastern provinces of the DRC. MONUC‟s actions in 2002 were intensified on the one 
hand with military observers who continued to monitor the ceasefire along frontiers 
especially in the Ituri district, while on the other hand the team was investigating violations of 
human rights perpetrated by various armed oppositions groups such as the MLC and RCD-
G.
77
  
 
In Pretoria at the end of 2002, the major Congolese parties to the conflict such as the DRC 
government, RCD-Goma, MLC, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani-
Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), RCD-National and the Mai-Mai signed the Global and 
All-Inclusive Agreement for a peaceful transition after several rounds of negotiations. The 
agreement was a sign of an arrangement which stipulated a power sharing deal during the 24 
month transition period leading up to the organisation of democratic elections. As a result of 
the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, the transitional government was established, 
composed of President Kabila and assisted by four Vice-Presidents, as well as 36 Ministers 
and 25 deputy Ministers.
78
 Furthermore, the signatories of the Global and All-Inclusive 
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Agreement agreed on the structure and composition of the parliament, civil society, and the 
independent electoral commission in support of democracy. 
 
The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement signed in Pretoria modified the nature of MONUC. 
The Security Council voted for resolution 1445 that approved the expansion of the military 
component of MONUC‟s intervention forces in the DRC and increased the number of blue 
helmets to 8500. Subsequently, MONUC, without using force, monitored the withdrawal of 
all foreign forces in the territory of the DRC, as well as supported the voluntary disarmament, 
demobilisation, repatriation, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRRR) process. In 2003, 
MONUC deployed its troops along the front lines in the East of the DRC in order to conduct 
DDRRR operations. Some of the UN contingents were deployed especially in Ituri where 
they monitored grave human rights violations while Ugandan troops were withdrawn, a 
situation which temporarily weakened MONUC. The situation and certain key areas of the 
country led the Security Council to vote for resolution 1493 which gave MONUC a new 
mandate. Resolution 1493 increased the military personnel to 10,800 in leading the operation 
to impose an arms embargo on the one hand, and authorised MONUC to use all necessary 
means to fulfil its mandate in Ituri and also in North and South Kivu.
79
 
 
According to the new mandate, for MONUC to achieve sustainable peace leading to free and 
fair elections, it was supposed to engage in a re-interpretation of its role in the DRC, as well 
as identify five core programmes such as: (1) peace and stability of the Eastern provinces of 
the DRC including stabilising the Ituri and Kivu provinces and  facilitating the return of 
300,000 Congolese refugees for the success of  DDR / DDRRR; (2) facilitating the transition 
process by supporting democratic elections, and helping the normal functioning of the 
transition government; (3) supporting the establishment of rule of law and human rights such 
as ending a culture of impunity, assistance in police training and criminal justice building; (4) 
improving human conditions for the sustainable peace by reintegrating child soldiers, 
addressing HIV/AIDS and sexual violence; and (5) supporting the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) for the establishment of the truth and reconciliation commission.
80
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In September 2003, MONUC placed a contingent in Ituri. Later on MONUC strengthened its 
units with the task force to the district which encouraged the DRC government to deploy a 
contingent of 700 Congolese police in Bunia for the security of the territory.
81
 
 
In 2004, MONUC troops were targeted in Ituri by militia groups while rebel general Laurent 
Nkunda occupied Bukavu. Blue helmets were forced to open fire in protection of their own 
installation. The Security Council again revised the mandate of MONUC and voted for 
resolution 1565 which increased MONUC‟s strength with 5,900 personnel taking in account 
the evolution of the situation in Ituri and Bukavu. The Security Council decided to give to 
MONUC the  mandate of: deploying and maintaining a presence in the key areas of potential 
volatility in order to promote the re-establishment of confidence; to discourage violence and 
to allow UN personnel to operate freely, particularly in the Eastern provinces of the DRC; 
ensuring the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat 
of physical violence; ensuring the protection of UN personnel, facilities, installations and 
equipment; ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its personnel; establishing the 
necessary border security within Operation in Burundi; and with the governments of DRC 
and Burundi to coordinate efforts towards monitoring and discouraging cross-border 
movements of combatants between the two countries.
82
 
 
In 2005, MONUC actions in Ituri and Kivu provinces were targeted by militia groups that 
allowed the Congolese government to arrest militia leaders among them Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, the leader of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) accused for adding insecurity 
in Ituri as well as for killing UN peacekeepers. Early in 2006, the Congolese government 
transferred Thomas Lubanga to ICC custody for war crimes and the use of child soldiers 
under the age of fifteen years. By October 2005, the Security Council adopted resolution 
1635 which increased the operation with 300 military personnel for the deployment of joint 
operations blue helmets –Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo 
(FARDC) in Oriental province. MONUC facilitated discussions between the Mouvement 
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Révolutionaire Congolais (MRC) a militia group with the government.
83
 As a result, several 
militiamen were disarmed in Ituri province and integrated into the FARDC. 
 
In 2006, as support to the electoral process in the DRC, the Security Council adopted 
resolution 1671 authorising European Union forces to help MONUC to coordinate national 
and local elections held in July 2006.
84
 
 
MONUC is the UN peacekeeping mission which has the largest budget around the globe. It 
cost around $5 billion between 1999-2007 and, as has been illustrated above, went through 
several resolutions voted on by the Security Council.
85
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Peacekeeping is a method developed by the UN as a way to help countries torn apart by 
conflict in order to create the conditions for lasting peace according to Chapter VI and VII of 
its Charter. In this perspective, the Charter authorises the UN to engage in conflicts between 
states as well as in civil wars within states. In that case, the UN operates as an independent 
third party in order to facilitate a forum which can be used to negotiate conflicts.  
Most of UN peacekeeping operations held in Africa responded to civil conflicts. 
 
The conflict of Somalia plunged the country into the Somali civil war in 1992. The scale of 
the civil war led the Security Council to vote for ONUSOM I, II and UNITAF. Those UN 
peacekeeping operations failed to bring peace and stability in the country. The Security 
Council instituted UNAMIR in 1993 in order to oversee the implementation of the Arusha 
peace. The civil war in Rwanda caused the genocide which spread ethnic violence between 
Tutsi and Hutu. The mission failed to intervene and to bring peace and stability in the 
country. In Angola, the Security Council initially authorised UNAVEM to support the 
enforcement of a ceasefire between the MPLA and UNITA. Since then, UNITA has 
continued to clash with the Angolan government which is composed in majority by MPLA 
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members. The violence led UNITA to reject national elections results. The mission failed to 
disarm mutinous UNITA forces as well as to unify the country. In Namibia and Mozambique, 
the Security Council has also organised peacekeeping missions such as UNTAG for Namibia 
and ONUMOZ for Mozambique, aimed at ending civil wars in both countries. The missions 
achieved successful elections which helped to ensure stability in both countries. In 1999, the 
Security Council established MONUC to monitor the ceasefire of the 1998 war. Despite 
several challenges, the mission achieved national democratic elections in 2006 by unifying 
belligerent factions around the government. The mission is still operating due to the 
persistence of violence in some Eastern areas of the country. Therefore, none of the selected 
UN peacekeeping missions mentioned above was similar to MONUC. In view of those five 
UN peacekeeping operations held in Africa, MONUC is the most complex and longest due to 
the dimension of the civil war as well as challenges on the ground. 
 
According to the UN system, the establishment of each peacekeeping operation is always 
preceded by an approval of resolutions made by the Security Council that names that 
peacekeeping operation, and defines its mandate as well as its duration. 
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Chapter three: THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND ROLE   
                          OF MONUC IN THE DRC 
 
Introduction 
 
The third chapter will examine the different phases of the transition process to democracy and 
the role of MONUC to facilitate and support the peace agreements in the DRC.  
 
The DRC found itself in an armed conflict as a result of an internal proliferation of rebel 
groups and an external intervention by military forces. The war provoked a series of 
displacements of thousands of Congolese people who either abandoned their homes or just 
went missing. Moreover, peculiar problems of legitimacy of governance, especially in the 
Eastern DRC posed a serious problem as a result of conflict zones. Generally, during and 
after the disaster of war, democratic institutions as well as the safety of vulnerable people are 
regularly threatened and require re-establishment. For that reason, the transition process was 
an opportunity for free and transparent elections in the DRC towards the set up of democratic 
institutions after the war. In this perspective, MONUC was established to address the political 
problems in the DRC by playing a key role during different phases of the peace 
implementation. In this regard, the UN Security Council voted for resolutions 1279 (1999) 
and 1291 (2000), authorising a peacekeeping operation for the DRC. The history of the 
transition process to democracy in the DRC has taken two major phases: the first phase 
covered the period from 1990 to 1997 while the second covered the period from 2003 to the 
2006 elections, elections that significantly shaped the peace process in the DRC.  
 
3.1. Transition to democracy: First phase (1990-1997) 
 
3.1.1. Congolese transitional political system  
 
The first phase of the Congolese transitional political system towards democracy began on 24 
April 1990 after President Mobutu announced the end of one-party rule and ushered in 
multiparty democracy as a consequence of the perestroika. Following Mobutu‟s speech, the 
opposition under the leadership of Etienne Tshisekedi, supported by civil society, demanded 
the holding of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) which opened the way to the 
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transition process towards democracy. Drawing support from the majority of Congolese 
people, the SNC opened on 7 August 1991 and soon after a conference was called to engage 
in broad national debates relating to elements of “truth and reconciliation” processes, and an 
outpouring of criticism against Mobutu and his regime.
86
 Resulting from the SNC conference 
was an agreement to have a two year transitional government led by the participant delegates.  
The transitional government led by a prime minister would be responsible to the transitional 
parliament. The conference also agreed that Mobutu was to remain as Head of State and 
elected opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi as prime minister, who along with Archbishop 
Laurent Monsengo was given responsibilities as president of the transitional parliament and 
the High Council of the Republic respectively.
87
 
 
What is clear is that the political situation after the SNC was influenced by the antagonism 
between Mobutu‟s allies and the Union Sacrée de l’Opposition Radicale (USORAL), a 
coalition of political parties of the opposition. As a result, Mobutu ignored the SNC‟s work. 
The antagonistic situation in the political arena led Mobutu in 1993 to appoint a government 
under Leon Kengo as Prime Minister which placed the country in an interminable political 
crisis. One of the goals of the SNC was to schedule and to organise presidential and 
legislative elections after the period of transition. Unfortunately, these never happened. The 
first phase of the transition to democracy failed to deliver according to the SNC‟s 
prescriptions. As a consequence, the country sank deeply into political turmoil that coincided 
with the crisis in the Great Lakes region and was followed by the intrusion of RPF and AFDL 
troops into the DRC in 1996.
88
 
 
In 1997 Laurent Kabila, the AFDL leader supported by Rwanda and Uganda, took over 
power from Mobutu, and proclaimed himself the new head of state and renamed the country 
the DRC. Laurent Kabila also annulled the transitional political process under the SNC by 
signing a presidential degree that returned the country to a one party state. All political parties 
were suspended until the adoption of a new constitution by the new Assembly was to be put 
in place. In fact, executive, legislative and military powers were wielded by Laurent Kabila 
himself together with government officials appointed by him. Later on in 1998, a crisis 
erupted and plunged the country into a civil war.  Facing a situation of eventual loss of 
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power, Laurent Kabila called for support from members of the South African Development 
Community (SADC). Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola joined the fighting on the side of the 
Congolese government while at the same time Rwandan and Ugandan troops fought on the 
side of rebel groups, the RCD and MLC.
89
 
 
In attempting to stop the civil war on the one side and on the other side solving the political 
problems in the DRC as well as in the Great Lakes region, the international community 
engaged in multiple negotiations such as the Lusaka Summit and the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue (ICD). Because of the critical situation in several domains in the country, MONUC 
was established to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Accord, also known as 
the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement.90   
 
3.1.2 The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 
 
After several meetings and negotiations, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed in July 
1999 by the Heads of States from the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and 
the Minister of Defence of Angola. All these officials were from countries involved in the 
DRC conflict, while by 31 August 1999 at least 50 people representing both Congolese rebel 
groups, the RCD and MLC, were also involved.
91
 Negotiated within a SADC framework, the 
objective of the accord, as its title indicates, was principally the call for the cessation of 
hostilities of military confrontation between internal proliferations of rebels groups and 
paramilitary forces, the subsequent withdrawal of foreign armed forces and finally the 
organisation of a national dialogue among the political Congolese parties for national 
reconciliation in the DRC. One of the principles of the agreement emphasised the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the DRC. These principles directly made all the belligerent states to 
commit to regional security in order to deal with their national security.
92
 But the problem 
with the Lusaka agreement resided in a lack of a comprehensible mechanism for its 
implementation. For instance, instead of the signatory parties conforming to principles of the 
agreement, they proceeded to consolidate their original positions and interests through 
hostilities. This created several obstacles to the accord, thereby hampering its 
implementation. 
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3.1.3. The beginnings of MONUC in the DRC 
 
3.1.3.1. History 
 
Following the Lusaka Summit, the UN Security Council in August 1999 authorised the first 
deployment of 90 UN military liaison personnel to the DRC.93 The UN Security Council 
through resolutions 1279 (1999) and 1291 (2000) established MONUC to monitor the peace 
process of the 1998 conflict in the DRC.94 
  
3.1.3.2. Mandate 
 
MONUC‟s original mandate in the DRC, in line with the adoption of resolution 1279 
authorised by the UN Security Council, included:  (1) implementing the ceasefire agreement; 
(2) monitoring and reporting on violations of the ceasefire agreement; (3) DDR and (4) the 
transition and the organisation of elections.
95
 Moreover, resolution 1291 passed by the UN 
Security Council in 2000 strengthened MONUC‟s mandate on top of its original function. 
Under Chapter VII, the UN Security Council provided MONUC with a main task of 
protecting its personnel, facilities as well as civilians under eminent threat of physical 
violence.
96
 
 
In an attempt to strengthen the MONUC mandate on the one side and on the other side  to 
redefine its mandate in the context of the DRC‟s political transition, the UN Security Council 
voted on a number of 1565 (2004) and 1625 (2005).
97
 As a result, MONUC with this broad 
mandate expanded into a multidimensional important resolutions such as 1355 (2001), 1376 
(2001), 1417 (2002), 1445 (2002), 1493 (2003), peacekeeping mission and contributed 
enormously to securing the peace deal in the DRC.
98
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3.2. Transition to democracy: second phase (2002-2006) 
 
3.2.1. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) 
 
In the meantime, Laurent Kabila was assassinated in early January 2001. His son Joseph 
Kabila took over and made possible the process of the ICD, the framework for the second 
Congolese transitional political system toward democracy. The ICD commenced in Pretoria 
on 17 December 2002 after a very violent five-year civil war.  The main objective of the ICD 
was to establish a new political system for a transitional government in the DRC culminating 
in the holding of democratic elections.
99
 The new political process focused on power-sharing 
between belligerent factions as well as other political parties and civil society groups. All 
levels of power were to be shared including the military, which meant the creation of a new 
army. This procedure made the peace accord to be a large and inclusive political dialogue.
100
 
The ICD brought all Congolese stakeholders together to the negotiating table in Sun City for 
the first time since the failed 1991 transition under Mobutu. The key purpose was to have 
groups agree on a new political system for a transitional government in the DRC.
101
As soon 
as the ICD was concluded cohabitation in government institutions became possible between 
belligerents and all other political forces. The final text of the ICD, known as the Global and 
All-Inclusive Agreement was approved at Sun City on 2 April 2003. The final agreement also 
provided the framework for the formation of a transitional government during a two year 
period starting on 30 June 2003. As a result, the country considerably progressed in the 
implementation of the accord which brought peace in some areas of the country.  The ICD 
was an indispensable stage in the new transitional political system towards peace and 
democracy in the DRC. The main facilitator of this process was the former President of 
Botswana, Sir Kitumile Masire. 
 
The second phase of the Congolese transitional political system toward democracy started 
with the promulgation of the transitional constitution after the signature of the Global and 
All- Inclusive Agreement. According to the Global and All- Inclusive Agreement, President 
Joseph Kabila remained the head of State and Commander in Chief of the army. However, he 
was to be assisted by 4 vice-Presidents, each in charge of a governmental commission. The 
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four were: Arthur Zahidi Ngoma representative of the non-armed opposition in charge of the 
Social and Cultural Commission; Jean-Pierre Bemba representative of the MLC in charge of 
the Economic and Finance Commission; Azarias Ruberwa the RCD-Goma‟s representative in 
charge of the Defence and Political Commission and Adboulaye Yerodia a representative of 
Kabila‟s member government in charge of the Reconstruction and Development 
Commission. In total there were 36 ministers and 25 deputy ministers for the transitional 
government.
102
 Therefore, the executive Congolese political system during the second 
transition was known as 1+4; a system adopted to deal with Congolese politicians wishing to 
become president.
103
 Once installed, the transitional government had the main task of 
organising multiparty elections after 2 years of a transitional period in order to restore the 
legitimacy of the government.
104
 The mandate of the different ministers was defined in the 
transitional constitution. To achieve a sustainable democracy in the country, the composition 
of the government represented all signatories of the All-Inclusive Agreement at Sun City in 
2003 as follows: 
- Ex Government : 7 ministers and 4 Vice- Ministers; 
- Non-armed Opposition: 7 Ministers and 4 Vice-Ministers; 
- Civil Society: 2 Ministers and 3 Vice-Ministers; 
- RDC-Goma: 7 Ministers and 4 Vice-Ministers; 
- MLC: 7 Ministers and 4 Vice-Ministers; 
- RCD-ML: 2 Ministers and 2 Vice-Ministers and 
- Mai-Mai: 2 Ministers and 2 Vice-Ministers105 
 
However, two major opposition parties, the UDPS and Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU) did 
not take part in the transitional government because they did not share the same consent as 
the others. 
 
Apart from the executive, the agreement also settled on the structure and composition of the 
transitional parliament in two chambers namely: a National Assembly comprising 500 
members presided over by the MLC and a Senate comprising 120 members.
106
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The National Assembly was the legislative body during the transitional period. Its task was 
threefold: legislative; financial and critical.
107
 The National Assembly also had the mandate 
of legislating and monitoring actions of the government as well as public enterprises, 
controlling and watching the implementation of the ICD resolutions and adopting the 
constitution through a popular referendum. 
108
 
 
The Senate was the parliament chamber in charge of elaborating the draft of a post-
transitional constitution. The post-transitional constitution was supposed to be submitted to a 
popular referendum through which the Congolese people should approve or reject it. The 
Senate was also a mediator organ between institutions in case of conflict.
109
 
 
During the transitional period, both the National Assembly and Senate had main legislative 
functions on matters of citizenship, decentralisation, public finance, the electoral process and 
supporting democracy.
110
 
 
The All-Inclusive Agreement fixed the quota of seats in both chambers as followed: 
 
Allocation of Seats in the Transitional Parliament 111 
 
 
Components and Entities  National Assembly Senate 
Ex-Government  94 22 
Non-armed 94 22 
Civil Society 94 22 
RCD-Goma 94 22 
MLC 94 22 
RCD-National 5 2 
RCD-ML 15 4 
Mai-Mai 10 4 
Total 500 120 
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Civil society was given the responsibility of five independent commissions in support of 
democracy. These were: 
- The Independent Electoral Commission ( IEC); 
- Human Rights Commission; 
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC); 
- Anti-corruption Commission and  
- Media Commission. 112 
 
The All-Inclusive Agreement included as well as the disarmament and integration of all rebel 
factions into the FARDC, the police as well as security services at national and provincial 
level. 
113
 
 
The judicial institutions were defined in the transitional constitution. Its members were 
appointed by the Minister of Justice and nominated by the President. 
114
 Magistrates, judges 
and judicial officers were expected to play their role in an efficient manner according to the 
transitional constitution. However, the government always ignored the judiciary 
independence by interfering without consulting the Supreme Council of the Judiciary.
115
 
 
3.2.2. MONUC: Second phase 
 
After the ICD, MONUC commenced its second phase. In the second phase, MONUC‟s 
observers alongside SADC, EU and OAU representatives attended the Pretoria meeting. To 
implement different transitional steps, MONUC had to actively engage in the Congolese 
crisis. However, regarding the transition to democracy, MONUC played a fundamental role 
towards a good outcome of the Congolese transition.
116
 For instance, MONUC supported the 
proposal of the ICD by deploying its troops to stop the fighting in order to facilitate the 
framework for the formation of the transitional government. For that reason, MONUC, 
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alongside the international community, had to facilitate the democracy-building process in 
the DRC through their electoral assistance.  
 
3.2.3. Electoral processes and the role of MONUC in the DRC 
 
As mentioned previously, “the main objective of the ICD was the establishment of a new 
political system for a transitional government in the DRC through the holding of democratic 
elections.”117 As a consequence, the transitional process to democracy ended with the holding 
of the 2006 national elections. However, the establishment of transitional institutions paved 
the way to the electoral process in the DRC which needed MONUC‟s support for the 
implementation of the ICD for a stable DRC. Therefore, MONUC played a major role in 
supporting the electoral process in the DRC. The organisation of the constitutional 
referendum in 2005 and national democratic elections in 2006 benefited enormously from 
MONUC‟s involvement. Together with the EU, MONUC contributed much to the funding of 
the DRC elections with $ 460 million.
118
 
 
After the installation of the entire executive and parliament, the IEC was installed in 2005. 
Soon the IEC started to prepare, with the assistance and support of MONUC (materials, 
human resources and finances), for the DRC elections such as the constitutional referendum 
in 2005 as well as the presidential, legislative and provincial elections in 2006. Rapidly, 
MONUC organised a logistical operation for the registration of voters. 50,000 vote offices 
were installed with assistance from MONUC observers throughout the country.
119
 Moreover, 
MONUC trained the IEC personnel and provided logistics for electoral practices. With 
MONUC‟s financial and logistic support, including the training of the IEC‟s personnel, the 
IEC was able to schedule the constitutional referendum on 18 December 2005, under 
MONUC‟s supervision. It is important to note that the organisation of the popular 
constitutional referendum of 2005 was the first legitimately democratic experience in the 
DRC since multi-party elections in 1960. The country was for three decades under Mobutu‟s 
dictatorship which did not allow the organisation of multi-party elections. According to IEC 
reports, up to 84,31 % of the Congolese electorate voted in favour of the constitution, while 
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15.69% of voters rejected it.
120
 The following year the post-transitional constitution was 
approved. Its approval was a new way of organisation of elections in the country which 
marked a new period for sustainable peace and effective democracy in the country. The 2006 
voting process organised by the IEC was supported by MONUC. 
 
General elections, both legislative and presidential, were held in 2006. Notably these were the 
first national elections in the country since independence. The UDPS boycotted the elections, 
arguing there were several irregularities that would result in the elections not being free and 
fair. However, the Congolese people managed to choose their national and regional leaders 
through the elections. For the presidential elections, thirty-three candidates including four 
women registered and competed. No candidate won an outright majority which led to a run-
off election between Jean-Pierre Bemba and Joseph Kabila. In the second round held in 
October 2006, Joseph Kabila emerged with 58.05% of the votes against Jean-Pierre Bemba‟s 
41.95%.
121
 Despite the appeal made by Jean-Pierre Bemba to the Supreme Court of Justice 
citing massive fraud and corruption during the voting exercise, Joseph Kabila was declared 
the winner and was officially sworn in as President of the DRC on 6 December 2006. 
 
In the legislative elections, nine hundred and thirty-two candidates registered and competed 
for five hundred seats for the National Assembly. The majority of seats in the National 
Assembly were won by the Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle (AMP), a coalition 
constituted of the Parti Pour la Réconstruction et le Dévelopment du Congo (PPRD), PALU 
and Union des Démocrates Mobutistes (UDEMO). It is this coalition which eventually 
formed the government.
122
  
 
The Senate elections saw the majority of seats taken up by the PPRD (22 seats), MLC (14 
seats) and RCD 7 (seats). The other 80 parties each received one seat.
123
 At the provincial 
level, elections of governors and vice-governors were held in the entire country in 2007. The 
governors and vice-governors of Kinshasa and all the other 10 provinces are all members of 
the AMP except the one from Equateur province.
124
 The organisation of free and fair 
elections marked the end of the Congolese transitional political system and brought about 
democracy in the country. Moreover, the holding of elections in the DRC was “the key 
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element in the move from a post-conflict transition to a democratic, unified and stable 
state.”125 Despite many challenges, the international community and MONUC played a 
preponderant role with logistical and political support for the success of the first democratic 
elections in the DRC. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The peace process was shaped significantly by the role of MONUC in its part of solving the 
Congolese political conflict. As a UN peacekeeping operation, MONUC faced enormous 
challenges to achieve political mechanisms for the success and the contribution to the 
Congolese political crisis such as the mechanisms of dealing with all Congolese rebel groups 
involved in the DRC conflict. The ICD provided an important starting point with the setting 
up of transitional institutions. Moreover, the ICD created a new political culture in the history 
of Congo for a stable DRC.
126
 The second phase of transition opened the new democratic era 
in the DRC through the holding of democratic elections since independence on the 30 June 
1960.MONUC and the international community committed themselves to support the 
Congolese during the period of transition. They played important roles towards the logistic 
and financial support for the holding of free and transparent elections in the DRC. They also 
channelled the DRC post-conflict political system to build on a democratic culture. 
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Chapter four: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MONUC WITH REGARD TO  
                         DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DRC 
 
Introduction 
 
This fourth chapter analyses MONUC‟s effectiveness between 1999 and 2006 with regard to 
democracy and human rights in the DRC. 
 
MONUC has been involved in the Congolese conflicts since 1999. Under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, MONUC helped to bring peace through a conducive political environment that 
enabled dialogues among Congolese political parties including belligerent factions in the 
DRC. Following negotiations, MONUC played a major role during the transitional process up 
to the holding of national elections which brought political legitimacy and a way of building 
democracy after the war. Apart from political problems, MONUC also increased attention on 
human rights especially in the Eastern DRC. Indeed, the war in the Kivus and Ituri districts 
killed many civilians and displaced thousands others who required protection, rehabilitation 
and integration back into society. MONUC supported the Congolese people in both 
operations for durable peace and stability of the country. 
 
4.1.  The FHI as an indicator of overall civil and political rights after the 
commencement of MONUC 
 
Many years of political stagnation and violence created insecurity and instability in the 
country. Both often disabled the state from having control over vast parts of the country, as 
well as providing fundamental services. Freedom House publishes annual reports assessing 
the degree of perceived democracy and human rights in each country.
127
 In so doing, since 
2002, it has published reports on political rights and civil liberties scores for the DRC. The 
FHI reports on the political rights and civil liberties are both ranked from 1 to 7 (with 1 
representing the highest level of freedom and 7 the lowest). 
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According to the FHI report in 2002, “the political rights rating improved from 7 to 6”.128 The 
improvement of political rights was due to the organization of the inclusive political dialogue 
such as the ICD. Indeed, all Congolese rebel groups, the non-armed opposition and the 
government met around a table and accepted a new political culture of cohabitation to end the 
war in the DRC. The civil rights rating ranked 7.
129
 Indeed, the fighting of remaining militia 
groups in the Eastern DRC, especially in Ituri and the Kivus, increased sexual violence and 
poverty among displaced people. In addition, children were recruited into militia groups for 
profits and wealth of militia groups. As a result, civil rights were not well protected because 
of the destruction of the judicial system.  
 
The FHI reports (2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006) show how the scores remained 6 for both 
political rights and civil liberties during the transitional period in the DRC.
130
 Indeed, 
Congolese people have never changed the government through democratic ways. For 
instance, all official members at national and local levels in different sectors were appointed 
by the president and vice presidents. As a result, all powers such as the executive, legislative, 
judiciary and military were concentrated in the hands of a small group. Moreover, the 
Kinshasa government continued with the harassment of human rights such as torture, 
arbitrary arrests, detention, repression and assaults throughout the country. Therefore, the 
democratic transition period was unstable. The peace was fragile and paved the way for the 
return of widespread violence. 
 
According to the Freedom House (2007) report, “the political rights rating improved from 6 
to 5”.131 The improvement of political rights was due to the organization of the first 
successful presidential and legislative democratic elections in 2006 since independence in 
1960.
132
For the first time since independence, Congolese people participated in both, a 
constitutional referendum in 2005 as well as presidential, legislative and provincial elections 
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in 2006. However, the 2007 report showed that the DRC is not an electoral democracy and 
has serious problems resulting in severe human rights abuses.
133
  
 
4.2.  Background of the Human Rights situation in the DRC  
 
4.2.1. The Human Rights situation (1990 - 1999) 
 
The implementation of human rights in the DRC remained poor even though there was the 
appearance of pockets of peace in the country. Congolese people never experienced 
fundamental human rights since independence in 1960. Moreover, Congolese people were 
neglected in different sectors such as justice, healthcare, and education. As a result, 
corruption, arbitrary arrests especially for people of different opinion increased all over the 
country.  
 
In 1990, with the beginning of the transition to multiparty democracy, opposition politics 
were permitted to operate in the country. Therefore, the transition process opened ways to 
freedom of assembly and association as well as freedom of expression to political parties and 
civil society. During this period, widespread human rights abuses were committed by 
members of the army and the Mobutu security forces. They were responsible for violations 
such as torture, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment with the consent of the highest 
authorities.
134
 Moreover, the ethnic violence in conflicts between “originaires” and “non-
originaires” perpetrated by Jeunesse de l’Union des Fédéralistes Républicains Indépendants 
(JUFERI) militia supported by Kyungu Wa Kumwanza, governor of Katanga province, 
against people from the Kasai provinces in 1993 killed thousands from violence, starvation 
and diseases while millions of Kasai people were displaced into camps. Despite all these 
tragic atrocities, no judiciary action against Kyungu Wa Kumwanza and his militia was 
taken. Impunity was the norm in Zaire (DRC) during the Mobutu era with the approbation of 
the highest authorities.
135
  
 
The 1994 the Rwandan genocide unlawfully killed around 800,000 Rwandan people and 
thousands Congolese people. Indeed, planned acts of vengeance against civilians were 
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committed by both the Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) and Hutu interhamwe in reaction 
to the conflict. Also, during the rebellion which brought Laurent Kabila into power, many 
massacres and human rights abuses were committed by the AFDL militia alongside the 
Rwandan RPF military against Congolese civilians and Hutu refugees in the Kivus. After 
removing Mobutu from power, Laurent Kabila quickly restricted political rights. All political 
parties were banned at the advantage of the AFDL and the Comité du Pouvoir Populaire 
(CPP) institution represented the powers of the government at local level throughout the 
country. As a result, the government intimidated opposition political parties and once again 
restricted the freedoms of press, expression, association and movement. In this perspective, 
Amnesty International condemned the Kabila government and labelled it repressive.
136
 For 
Amnesty International “the human rights situation deteriorated since Laurent Kabila came to 
power: political activists, journalists, human rights defenders and trade unionists all worked 
under the threat of intimidation, harassment, arrest or torture for security institutions such as 
Agence Nationale de Renseignements (ANR) and Détection Militaire Anti-Patrie 
(DEMIAP).”137 For instance in February 1998, Etienne Tshisekedi, leader of the UDPS was 
arrested and relegated to Kabeya-Kamwanga, his native village in Kasai Oriental province, 
under security monitoring of the then government.
138
  
 
From August 1998 even worse violations were committed in the country such as rape and 
torture which characterised the conflict, especially in the Eastern DRC. Amongst the 
belligerent factions and militia groups, women and young girls were exposed to sexual 
violence which became a weapon of war against men in rebel held territories. Women were 
abused by government security forces as well as belligerent factions and militia groups. Many 
Congolese civilians were victims of unlawful detention, inhuman and degrading treatment by 
these same forces. Moreover, during the 1998 war, all Congolese rebel groups and countries 
involved in the conflict including the DRC government recruited children in their ranks. The 
recruitment of child soldiers was a violation of the International Convention on the Rights of 
the Child to which the DRC is a signatory. Similar to the Mobutu era, corruption, arbitrary 
arrest, detention and torture of opposition party members continued to occur in both the 
Kinshasa government and rebel held territories. Thus, human rights remained poor. 
Congolese people could not change the government peacefully and the government security 
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forces were responsible for various abuses, e.g killings, torture, beatings, rape, and 
disappearances, with impunity.
139
 
 
Following the tragedy on the ground, in 1999 the UN sent a peacekeeping mission to assess 
the human rights situation in the territories of both the Kinshasa government and those held 
by the rebels.  
 
4.2.2.  The Human rights situation (1999 - 2003) 
 
During the period 1999-2003, despite MONUC‟s presence, the government‟s security forces 
continued to act with impunity throughout the country.
140
 The ANR, a specialised 
government security branch, committed many serious violations of human rights such as 
torture, repression and disappearances of opponents and political members of the opposition 
in various cities across the country. Security forces engaged in arbitrary arrests, assaults, 
detentions, threats and abuses of journalists and media outlets to limit freedom of press and 
freedom of expression.
141
 In territories under rebel control, militia groups in several areas of 
the Eastern provinces also committed violations against civilians such as destroying villages 
and houses, killing and kidnapping men, raping women and recruiting children for military 
service.
142
 
 
4.2.2.1.  Human rights in territories under control of the Kinshasa government  
 
In areas under government control the human rights record was reduced because numerous 
serious violations were committed. Government security forces especially the ANR, an 
intelligence agency responsible for internal and external security in the DRC, the Garde 
Spéciale Présidentielle (GSP) and DEMIAP security forces all reported directly to Joseph 
Kabila on the one hand, and on the other hand the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) and 
FARDC committed several abuses such as torture, beatings, and acts of rape, arbitrary 
detention, extortion, and other abuses against the civilian population and politicians of 
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opposition parties.
143
 Generally, these government security forces mentioned above acted 
with impunity and sometimes independently of government authority.
144
 Indeed, members of 
the security forces were undisciplined, poorly paid and poorly trained. The lack of 
professionalism among security force agents significantly decreased the DRC„s human rights 
record. Also, President Kabila and his government used the pretext of war to severely limit 
the rights of citizens in the country. For that reason, the freedoms of opinion and media, 
movement, assembly and association were restricted. Political leaders and parties including 
journalists were often repressed or intimidated by security forces to express their opinions. 
Sometimes the government harassed journalists by seizing newspapers and printing 
equipments. Television channels and radio stations broadcasted under government control 
with many restrictions. Members of security forces used excessive and unjustified force 
against supporters of political parties during demonstrations. Demonstrators were frequently 
targets of intimidation, death threats and arbitrary arrests. Inhuman and degrading treatments 
in cells and prisons were the way of operating for security forces agents against civilians 
according to their political affiliations. As a result, security forces agents committed unlawful 
killings, beatings, torture with impunity. In some areas, women were marginalised and 
relegated to a secondary role in the society. For instance in the Northern part of the country, 
women were victims of genital mutilation and they were not protected. A number of women 
suffered from discrimination characterised by violence against them.
145
 The government did 
not protect the rights of children because they were recruited as soldiers into the FARDC. 
 
4.2.2.2.  Human rights in territories under rebel control 
 
In rebel held territories, the human rights situation was volatile and the life of people was at 
serious risk. The MLC and RDC-Goma rebel groups and their ally‟s troops severely harassed 
the population in the Eastern DRC. They committed human rights abuses such as limiting 
citizen‟s rights (freedoms of speech, press, assembly and movement). Regarding the freedom 
of expression and opinion, independent journalists were arrested, threatened and detained 
after broadcasting programmes from Radio Télévision Nationale Congolaise (RTNC) 
Kinshasa, the national television channel. For this reason, the leaders of rebel groups shut 
down RTNC Kinshasa programmes by putting local television programmes under their 
effective supervision and censorship. In addition, newspapers were banned to prevent 
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circulation of articles supposed hostile to them. As a result, journalists were warned to stop 
their radio and television transmitting from Kinshasa.
146
 For instance, in the territory under 
RCD control, all previous existing political parties were suspended. Moreover, all political 
associations and meetings were banned and severely reprimanded by RCD rebels and while 
in the territory under MLC control, pygmies were victims of cannibalism, systematic rape, 
torture and kidnapping.
147
 
 
In Ituri MLC militia and Ugandan soldiers alongside with Hema tribal militia committed 
massacres and violence against civilians. The massacre of civilians in the area was based 
mostly on tribal criteria. Moreover, the MLC and RCD/N committed massacres in Mambassa 
and Eringeti in their joint military operation “Effacer le tableau”.148 The operation consisted 
in destroying everything in those areas during their passage. 
 
As a result, in rebel held territories, human rights remained poorly implemented. Rebel 
officers committed various human rights abuses with impunity because the judicial system 
was not operational and the judges fled into Kinshasa government controlled territory during 
the war.
149
 
 
4.3.  MONUC and the human rights situation in the DRC: 1999 to 2003 
 
When the Security Council established MONUC in 1999, the DRC was divided into three 
segments: one for the government, one area under the influence of the Rwandese alongside 
the RCD and one for the MLC and Ugandan forces. 
 
In an attempt to end the DRC war, the Security Council authorised 5,537 UN military 
personnel including 550 UN military observers to supervise the initial Lusaka Peace 
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Accords.
150
 After the deployment of UN troops in the country, speedily 2000 blue-helmets 
were positioned to the ceasefire line between belligerent factions for the fulfilment of the 
clauses of the agreement.
151
 Despite the UN deployment, the fighting continued in the 
Eastern DRC. The fighting in the Kivus and Ituri districts displaced around 3.4 million 
Congolese civilians who were unprotected from local militias‟ threats. This situation 
remained precarious because of massacres and ethnic violence perpetrated by militia groups 
as well as the proliferation of arms linked to the exploitation of natural resources in the 
region. As a consequence, in 2002 ethnic fighting erupted between the Hema and Lendu 
tribes. The UPC was a militia Hema group while the Front des Nationalistes et 
Intégrationistes (FNI) was a militia Lendu group. According to the Human Rights Watch 
report called “The curse of gold”, during the series of attacks between Hema and Lendu, two 
thousand civilians were killed, while over 140,000 were displaced in camps or in the 
forest.
152
 Moreover, the FNI installed terror in Ituri by resorting to arbitrary arrests, beatings, 
and other forms of cruel practices on civilians while the UPC tortured, arrested and executed 
civilians suspected of cooperating with the Lendu.
153
 UPC militia groups committed crimes 
against humanity and were condemned by the Security Council of serious atrocities against 
civilians. 
 
Following the Hema and Lendu ethnic fighting, MONUC deployed a contingent of 10 blue-
helmets to support the Ituri situation.
154
 The number of blue-helmets deployed lacked means 
and was insignificant to force both the UPC and the FNI to negotiate. However, the MONUC 
force in Ituri attempted without success to assist and protect suffering civilians, and in order 
to strengthen security in Ituri as well as end violations of human rights from local militias, the 
Security Council enacted resolution 1445 which enlarged the MONUC force with 8,700 
military personnel.
155
 
 
In 2002, fighting erupted between the MLC alongside the RCD-N against the RCD/ML 
militias in the Oriental province. During the occupation, civilians were killed, villages were 
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destroyed and violence took place in Mambassa. Rapidly, MONUC placed a team of blue-
helmets to ensure the protection of civilians and end violations of human rights, while also 
surveying the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Accords. As calm returned in Mambassa, 
early in 2003, MONUC reported its first broad human rights investigations on the Mambassa 
fighting. The report estimated that “some of these troops committed systematic rapes, looting, 
summary executions and ten confirmed cases of cannibalism against people of the Nande 
ethnic group.”156As a result, on 15 January 2003, the Security Council condemned the MLC 
and RCD-N for systematic massacres and violations in Mambassa such as torture, rape, 
killing and cannibalism.
157
 
 
In March 2003, the Security Council initiated trials against the MLC, RCD-ML and UPC at 
the ICC for human rights violations and crimes committed in the DRC. According to the 
Human Rights Watch report, DRC: ICC’s trial focuses on Child Soldiers, Thomas Lubanga 
the leader of the UPC militia was charged of enlisting and conscripting children under the age 
of 15 as soldiers as well as widespread killing, rape and the torture of thousands of civilians 
in Ituri.
158
 Later on in 2006, Thomas Lubanga was arrested and transferred to the ICC in The 
Hague for the issuing of international crimes.
159
  
 
Having the mandate of monitoring the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Accords, in 2003 
MONUC started DDRRR operations of foreign soldiers involved in the DRC conflict. 
MONUC was supported in this disarmament by representatives from the Congolese 
government, as well as from countries involved in the DRC conflict (Rwanda, Burundi and 
Uganda) who helped identify foreign combatants. Moreover, MONUC conducted several 
missions in the Eastern DRC to seek foreign troops in order to encourage them to join the 
DDRRR process. As a result of DDRRR operations, which targeted foreign soldiers on 
Congolese territory, around 15,000-20,000 foreign combatants with up to 30,000 dependents 
were located in the Eastern DRC.
160
 Among foreign combatants in the Eastern DRC, 13,000 
Rwandan soldiers were repatriated to Rwanda by MONUC. In addition, 3,085 Forces 
Burundaises pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) and 501 Forces Nationales de 
Libération (FNL) and around a thousand of Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADL) 
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soldiers were repatriated by MONUC to their respective countries. At the same time, 
MONUC got involved in UNICEF‟s programme of separating children from armed 
belligerents and militias. As part of its tasks, MONUC succeeded to disarm 9,000 Mai-Mai 
combatants to integrate them into the FARDC. MONUC‟s DDR operations teams were 
established in the Kivus.  Reception centres for the DDR programme enabling contact with 
belligerent factions and militia groups were in Goma, Bukavu, Butembo, Beni and Uvira. The 
DDR operation continued until the end of 2007.  
 
Despite MONUC‟s DDR programme, many disarmed and integrated militias returned to their 
previous duties which constituted insecurity as a serious concern in the Kivus.
161
 As a result, 
human rights abuses and widespread atrocities continued to be committed in the Eastern DRC 
by remaining militia groups. 
 
4.4.    Human rights in the DRC with MONUC: 2003 to 2006 
 
4.4.1. Abuses of civil and political rights 
 
The country‟s draft constitution approved by the National Assembly and the Senate 
guaranteed some rights such as independence of institutions, freedom of expression, freedom 
of press, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, rights to freedom of assembly and 
association.
162
 In addition, the country registered around 220 political parties including the 
MLC and RCD, the former rebel groups.
163
 However, this fact on its own did not guarantee 
the putting into practice of constitutional rights. 
 
It should be noted that the transitional administration officially began on 30 June 2003 with 
the establishment of the transitional government and other institutions for two years. Despite 
this fact, the ANR, DEMIAP, FARDC, PNC and other specialised government security 
forces continued to get involved in many serious abuses including repressing the civil 
liberties of the civilian population with different political affiliations. The situation of human 
rights during the post-conflict transition was as follows: 
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4.4.1.1. Freedom of expression and press 
 
Freedom of expression and press guaranteed by the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights to which the DRC is party was seriously affected.  Several members of the 
opposition, public critics and journalists were threatened, arrested or tortured by government 
security forces. On 30 June 2005 Pastor Albert Lukusa, the pastor of Nouvelle Cité de David 
a Christian Church in Lubumbashi was arrested, tortured and detained by the ANR agents 
just because he disapproved in a sermon with President Joseph Kabila and the government. 
After he was released from an ANR facility in October the same year, he died two months 
later, due to the inhuman and degrading treatments received.
164
 The following year, on 14 
May 2006, another pastor, Kutino Fernando, founder of an evangelical religious movement 
and his colleague, pastor Bompere were arrested simply because they criticised excessive 
foreign influence over the government.
165
 Both pastors are still in detention at Makala 
correctional service in Kinshasa up to this writing. 
 
Frequently the government‟s security forces intimidated and attacked journalists, political 
leaders and their supporters during demonstrations. In June 2005 UDPS supporters 
demonstrated in Kinshasa and other provinces of the country against the government‟s 
decision to delay the organisation of national democratic elections, which was judged “anti 
constitutional.” As a result, in Mbuji-Mayi, Oriental Kasai province, government security 
forces killed fifteen UDPS supporters and injured another twenty six demonstrators during 
the demonstration.
166
 In addition, UDPS leaders and other supporters were arrested and 
detained in jail where they underwent torture for weeks. The same day in Kinshasa, in 
another demonstration, several UDPS supporters and leaders were arrested, beaten and 
dispersed by force. Journalists were also arrested, their equipment was destroyed, and they 
were warned to stop their coverage of UDPS demonstrations.
167
 As the government and its 
specialised security services got disappointed with the press coverage, they suspended the 
operation of RAGA TV, Radio Télé Kin Malebo (RTKM), Tropicana TV and other television 
channels and radio stations. Some journalists of the above-mentioned private television 
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channels and radio stations were arrested during live TV or radio broadcasts by the PNC, and 
upon their release, they were prevented from entering their offices. Others were summoned to 
conform to the national information agency.  Moreover, during the period preceding the end 
of the transition, in June 2005, towards the organisation of elections in 2006, several 
members of the opposition parties, independent journalists and independent media watchdogs 
who were critics of the government were physically tortured, threatened or arrested and put in 
jail by the government.
168
 In some other places, newspapers that were in favour of the 
government succeeded as regular publications all over the country.
169
  
 
During the electoral campaign period, one journalist published articles criticizing the 
transition period in Kinshasa. On 8 July 2006, he was killed by unidentified armed men.
170
 
Kabeya Pindi Passi, a television journalist of Tropicana TV and president of the National 
Press Union in Congo, fled the country after receiving anonymous death threats from Vice-
President Jean Pierre Bemba‟s supporters after his publication on their human rights abuses 
committed before and during the transition period.
171
 The next month in August, twelve 
journalists of television channels Canal Congo Télévision (CCTV) and Canal Kin, owned by 
Jean Pierre Bemba, were also victims of anonymous death threats after reporting MLC 
incidents of two days in Kinshasa.
172
 The government‟s security forces continually seized 
newspapers in order to stop articles which were estimated to present information in a biased 
way against government policy. Moreover, several television channels, radio stations and 
private newspapers were either suspended or obligated to operate according to government 
guidelines. As a result, some political reports of daily newspapers, radio Okapi and 
independent journalists reporting on corruption or constitutional matters were either killed or 
sentenced to prison.
173
 As such, there is no freedom of expression and press in the DRC. 
Congolese people are unable to exercise these rights. 
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4.4.1.2. Freedom of assembly and association 
 
During the transitional process, the government systematically continued to limit the right of 
freedom of assembly and association while the constitution provided for it. According to the 
Congolese government, the right of freedom of assembly and association in public places is 
important, but should not disturb public order. For that reason, the government obliged 
political parties, NGOs and other organisations to apply for the authorisation of 
demonstrations against the government, diplomatic missions and other matters. Therefore, the 
government often harassed political movements and their leaders as well as protestors, thus 
leaving each demonstration with no other option but being preceded by a local authority‟s 
notification. The experience on the ground confirmed that opposition political parties‟ 
demonstrations which were directed against government decisions were most seriously 
affected by the Ministry of the Interior‟s sanctions. As a result, the government often used 
excessive force against demonstrators through the PNC such as the UDPS demonstration on 
30 June 2005 in Mbuji Mayi and Kinshasa.
174
 Subsequently at the UDPS demonstrations, all 
journalists and a number of media broadcasters that were covering the event were threatened 
or arrested. As a consequence, several private media were suspended by the Minister of Press 
and Communication.  
 
On 19 May 2006, security forces arrested 32 South African individuals under the pretext of 
plotting a coup d‟état. Those particular individuals were members of a private South African 
security company appointed to protect some presidential candidates during the electoral 
campaign. The police illegally detained them at the Kin-Mazière Detention Centre without 
filing any formal charges. They remained three days in the detention centre.
175
 
 
In July 2006, the PNC dispersed a UDPS demonstration against the organisation of elections 
in Likasi, Katanga province under the instructions of the local mayor. Apparently, the 
incidents started when the police sprayed teargas that seriously injured some people, and 
among them one man fell into coma.
176
 Many of the demonstrators were arrested and 
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detained without charges. The police released them some days later without filing any formal 
charges. 
 
In September 2006, security forces arrested sixteen members (ten men and six women) of the 
Solidarity for National Development, a political movement in Tshikapa (Kasaï province), 
who contested the temporary results of the elections of the National Assembly by the IEC. 
The local authority of Tshikapa gave instructions to the police to use excessive force in order 
to disperse the demonstrators claiming the demonstration threatened public order. 
177
 All 
arrested demonstrators remained in detention and were released two days later. 
 
In October 2006, security forces dispersed a student uprising in Kisangani demanding the 
release of their principal who was imprisoned. In their confrontation, the police fired into the 
air causing serious injuries on approximately nineteen students. The arrested students were 
held at the police station for more than three days. In addition, during the student‟s detention, 
the policemen attempted to rape a young girl among them and subjected many other students 
to cruelties and inhuman treatments.
178
 
 
Security services were responsible for serious violations of human rights during the period of 
transition. Political movements and their leaders, as well as human rights defenders and 
NGOs were often harassed by government security services, violating and restricting the right 
of freedom of assembly and association from holding and organise protest meetings for 
political movements on the one hand, and from making public observations for human rights 
defenders and NGOs on the other hand. 
 
4.4.1.3. Freedom of religion 
 
The constitution provides for freedom of religion. Therefore, the government called religious 
groups to register in a non-discriminatory way in order to be recognized. As such, religious 
groups should not disturb the public order nor oppose universal moral values. 
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In June 2005, a religious ethnic and political group called Bundu Dia Kongo based in the Bas 
Congo province called for the establishment of a kingdom for the Bakongo.
179
 The 
government estimated that the Bundu Dia Kongo march was plotting to bring about an anti-
Kabila rebellion in the province for its separatist political characters. As a result, FARDC 
soldiers and PNC government security forces dispersed the demonstrators by using force and 
arrested five of them. The arrested members were held in an ANR detention without formal 
charges and they were subjected to cruelties and inhuman treatments.
180
 
 
Following the Bundu Dia Kongo demonstrations, the government, in accordance with the 
High Authority of Medias (HAM), an independent institution supporting democracy, 
suspended all religious radio stations and television channels including Radio Télé Message 
de Vie (RTMV) from broadcasting political and news programmes for a period.
181
 Prior to the 
event, Reverend Kutino Fernando, RTMV‟s owner, was harassed by security government 
forces to give tape recordings of a call-in program broadcasted between 9 and 11 April where 
he stated the end of the transitional government in transferring power to the population on 30 
June 2005.
182
 After the 30 June 2005, the government allowed stations to broadcast as usual. 
 
4.4.1.4. Freedom of movement 
 
Although the constitution provides for freedom of movement within the country, government 
security forces sometimes restricted this right by putting checkpoints in airports, national 
roads and ports, for security reasons. Following this disposition, security forces harassed 
national civilians by extorting their money or detaining them until such time that a payment 
of money, i.e. a bribe, is made.
183
 
 
4.4.1.5. Situation of women 
 
The situation of women remained precarious in the DRC. Women and girls were victims of 
sexual violence including rape throughout the country. Although the transitional parliament 
                                                            
179Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2006,  Department of State in 
accordance with section 102 of the international religious freedom act 1998, 
http://hcfa.house.gov/110/38274.pdf , 2005, p 25 
180 Ibid 
181 Ibid 
182 Ibid 
183 Freedom House, Advancing Freedom for 70 years: Freedom in the World- Congo, Democratic Republic of 
(Kinshasa) (2006), edition 2006, Op Cit.  
 
 
61 
 
adopted a new sexual violence law, the government did not successfully put this law into 
force. Women and girls who were sexually violated remained unprotected by the local 
authorities and a national plan for protection and assistance of women and girls who were 
victimized by sexual violence did not exist, and as a result, women and girls were often at 
great risk of sexual harassment, rape, forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, and other sexual 
crimes particularly in the Eastern provinces. On several occasions, they were unwillingly 
raped and became pregnant by security forces, and when they reported abuses committed on 
them, perpetrators who were involved in the violations were suspended from their duties for 
legal prosecution. 
 
The OHCHR (2007) issued a public report which showed how security forces, particularly 
the PNC and FARDC continued to sexually abuse women and girls in the DRC. The report 
highlights a wide range of sexual violence such as rape against women and girls perpetrated 
by government security forces, particularly the PNC and FARDC. In August 2006, twelve 
identified policemen and other unidentified policemen alongside sixteen civilians 
systematically raped 37 women and girls in the Bolongo-loka village in the Equateur 
province.
184
 The incident caused panic which forced hundreds of villagers to escape and seek 
refuge in another place or in the forest. Investigations of rape and assault against women and 
girls were conducted by a local court. As a result, nine perpetrators, seven PNC agents and 
two civilians who were implicated in the violations were arrested and detained in a military 
prison in Lisala.
185
 The same scenario happened in two localities of the Bongandanga 
territory in the Equateur province. More than 6 women were raped by a PNC commander 
alongside policemen under his orders. As numerous abuses continued to occur throughout the 
country, according to reports, the FARDC and PNC used rape to retaliate against targeted 
territories such as the districts of Equateur and the Kivu provinces. For instance during the 
Rutshuru (North Kivu province) fights, the FARDC used rape and sexual violence as 
weapons of war.
186
 As a consequence of the fighting, between 40 and 90 women and girls 
were sexually violated by the FARDC. Also, in Uvira (South Kivu), young girls of 10 years 
of age were intimidated and raped by FARDC soldiers, thus causing a climate of fear among 
women and young girls who were at great risk of sexual violence in the region.
187
 FARDC 
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soldiers contributed to a decline of human rights in Kivu and the Eastern provinces and as 
such impunity prevailed. 
 
The PNC also committed mass rape and sexual violence throughout the country against 
women and young girls, sometimes in police custody or in front of the victims‟ families. For 
example, in Mbuji Mayi, the Oriental Kasaï province, a woman was raped by a group of 
policemen when she was in detention in a police station cell.
188
 Other women were victims of 
rape in Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps in the North and South Kivu provinces 
situated near the police station. Rape by both the PNC and FARDC was a serious problem in 
Kivu and in the Oriental provinces. Most of the PNC agents and FARDC soldiers were not 
prosecuted. Some of them were arrested while a number among them remained with total 
impunity. 
 
4.4.1.6. Situation of children 
 
The laws guaranteed by the International Convention on the Rights of the Child to which the 
DRC is a party were neglected. Although the constitution prohibits all forms of abuse through 
its articles on the protection of children‟s rights, several abuses such as hard labour, 
accusations on the practice of sorcery, trafficking of children as soldiers and porters, sexual 
violence and services continued to occur all over the country. With very few exceptions, most 
of the accusations on the practice of sorcery led many children to abandon their families 
which forced them to become street children. Moreover, one of the costs of the war in the 
country was the increase in the number of orphans. This prevented them from enjoying their 
rights, thus leading thousands to become homeless in Kinshasa and other cities of the DRC. 
Many homeless children were malnourished and the transitional government did not 
adequately assist or protect them. As a result, large numbers of them engaged in prostitution, 
criminal bands, begging and were mostly used as child soldiers during the conflict period.
189
 
 
Human Rights Watch published detailed reports on human rights abuses on children in the 
DRC. Reports showed in general how security forces abused street children, raping them and 
stealing their belongings while armed groups in the Eastern provinces continued to enrol 
child soldiers in their ranks. Some street children were often arbitrarily arrested and abused 
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by security forces. Homeless girls were especially targeted by security forces in big towns, 
and they were victims of severe harassment and sexual exploitation by security forces. 
Reports showed that the situation of children in the Eastern provinces was especially 
precarious. Some minor children continued to serve in armed groups such as the FNI, and 
Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais (FAPC) as well as work in inhuman conditions in the 
diamond mines in Ituri. Although the Congolese government collaborated with the United 
Nations Children‟s Fund (UNICEF) and MONUC through an international programme to 
prevent children from becoming child soldiers and to combat child labour, the UN special 
rapporteur for the DRC reported in 2004 that “the number of orphans and street children 
increased during the year: 25,000 and 50,000 child refugees, war orphans, and child sorcerers 
roamed the streets throughout the entire country, although some of those who were not 
orphans returned to their families at day's end.”190 Following the UN special rapporteur, it is 
true that the war exposed several children to different kinds of harassments throughout the 
country, especially in warring zones. 
 
In 2004, Human Rights Watch conducted investigations into allegations of serious human 
rights violations committed against civilians by militias under General Laurent Nkunda and 
Colonel Jules Mutebutsi following the occupation of Bukavu. Reports described human rights 
abuses against children based on an ethnic criterion. In Bukavu children experienced 
nightmares of sexual violence during the occupation of the town by General Nkunda‟s and 
Colonel Jules Mutebutsi‟s militias. For instance, the militias abused four teenage girls by 
asking their ethnicity and then raping them more than once.
191
  
 
4.4.1.7. Independence of the judiciary 
 
The independence of institutions was not guaranteed in practice, especially for the judiciary. 
The judiciary system was under the influence of government officials. Corruption and 
manipulation were the code of conduct of the judiciary system because of lack of experienced 
personnel and resources.
192
 The High Court of Justice did not maintain effective control on 
both civilian and military courts. As a result, judgements were arbitrarily pronounced which 
led to prisons being overcrowded. Because of long periods of imprisonment, conditions in 
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prisons where not good, with no privacy and most prisoners ending up sick and/or dead due 
to lack of medications and food. Until now, arbitrary detentions remain a serious problem in 
the country. 
 
4.4.2. Run-up to the election 
 
During the period preceding the 2006 national democratic elections, numerous violations on 
civil and political rights were committed by the police, the ANR and other government 
security forces. In fact, the police, the ANR and other government security forces engaged in 
practices such as arbitrary arrest, illegal detention or acts of physical violence, including 
beatings or use of excessive and unjustified force during political protest demonstrations 
resulting in the Congolese government restricting freedom of expression, assembly, and the 
freedom of the press prior to the elections. 
 
According to a MONUC report in 2006, “The Human Rights situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo”, government security forces committed various human rights abuses in 
Mbuji Mayi, during UDPS protests on 30 June and fifteen supporters were killed, while 
twenty-six others were injured and some leaders were arbitrarily arrested by the 
government‟s security forces.193 The government responses to the UDPS demonstrations and 
a series of journalists‟ arrests were simply practices predisposed to decline freedom of press 
and freedom of expression and assembly.  In addition, the OHCHR reported that during the 
period between public statements of the temporary results of the presidential elections, many 
violations of human rights were committed. Following the proclamations of presidential 
results, violence left four policemen dead and the High Authority for Media (HAM) and the 
National Human Rights Observatory (NHRO), two important institutions of the transition, 
looted.
194
 During the electoral process, human rights declined in the DRC, and both 
government security forces and the security division of Jean Pierre Bemba were responsible 
for many serious abuses against civilians supposedly in a contrary political tendency. 
Above all, despite constitutional guarantees on political rights and civil liberties approved by 
both the National Assembly and the Senate, the UDPS did not participate in the referendum 
nor take part in the 2006 elections. International observers perceived some irregularities and 
political corruption during the electoral registration. In spite of those irregularities, the 
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elections were said to be free and transparent. Moreover, during the time of announcement 
for the presidential results by the IEC, the MLC rejected the outcome. As a result, clashes 
between the MLC and government troops arose, and Jean Pierre Bemba, the leader of the 
MLC, fled into exile in 2007 to save his life.
195
 
 
4.4.3. MONUC’s impact on the human rights situation 
 
The human rights situation in the country remained unstable in the Eastern provinces 
especially in the Ituri and Bunia districts where rival factions and local militias continued to 
commit atrocities. As usual, in such conflicts women were raped by local militias and people 
were forced to move to other regions of the country or neighbouring countries. Instead of 
assisting vulnerable groups, MONUC peacekeepers became involved in gross human rights 
violations such as sexual exploitation and abuse of women and children.
196
 They were 
plunged into accusations of sexual misconduct with prostitutes which is a violation to the UN 
Code of conduct for peacekeeping troops.
197
 Security did not exist and the situation in both 
districts was horrendous with an estimated 50,000 people killed during local militias and 
ethnic fighting.
198
  
 
In 2003, MONUC become involved alongside the international community including the 
Congolese and Ugandan governments in the pacification of Ituri through the Ituri Pacification 
Commission (IPC).
199
 Also MONUC consolidated its position in several areas of Bunia. It 
provided security by coordinating deployments of multinational forces in both districts. For 
instance, in Bunia MONUC forces protected civilians, the airport and vital installations while 
providing a peacekeeping and reconciliation roadmap in Ituri.
200
 With the deployment of 
multinational forces, stability returned in some areas and thousands of civilians returned and 
reintegrated into society.
201
 Moreover, early in 2004 MONUC helped to end impunity in 
Bunia. Justice was restored: the prison, courthouse, police headquarters and judges 
                                                            
195  Freedom House, Advancing Freedom for 70 years :Freedom in the World- Congo, Democratic Republic of 
(Kinshasa) (2006), edition 2006,Op Cit 
196 Dagne, T, Op Cit 
197 Ibid 
198 Horman, K, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, European Commission, May 2007 
199 Dagne, T, Op Cit 
200 Ibid, pp 1-2 
201 United Nations Security Council (4), Fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, www.kongo-
kinshasa.de/dokumente/uno/N0427867.pdf, March 2004, p6 
 
 
66 
 
accommodations were renovated by MONUC and the international community.
202
Also, 81 
police officers were trained by MONUC for patrolling duties and other functions.
203
 
 
Despite some military shortcomings, MONUC supported the peace process and succeeded to 
pacify Bunia and Ituri. Although the war in the Eastern DRC was almost finished, some areas 
continued as serious threats to the stability of the country. To address this issue, MONUC 
continued both DDRRR and DDR programmes of the remaining forces where hostilities 
persisted. For instance, in 2005 and 2006, MONUC supported the FARDC with logistics in a 
joint military operation of repatriation of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda 
fighters (FDLR).
204
 
 
Moreover, MONUC got in touch with the armed groups in the Northern DRC. This contact 
allowed MONUC to help the Commission Nationale pour la Démobilisation et Réinsertion 
(CONADER) in the DDR programme to disarm over 165,000 former combatants by 
providing security at centres. Furthermore, the disarmament of remaining former combatants 
reduced the level of insecurity in some of the Eastern areas. In the perspective of reducing 
insecurity in the Kivus through Radio Okapi, MONUC continued to send messages 
encouraging remaining Rwandan soldiers and armed groups still in the forest to enter 
DDRRR and DDR.
205
  
 
As to the reform of the security sector, during the transition MONUC, alongside the 
international community, played a predominant role in devising mechanisms of transitional 
justice for justice to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the five years 
of civil war in the DRC. For that reason, MONUC‟s Human Rights Section dealt with 
judicial issues for the extrajudicial solutions because of the weak justice system in the 
DRC.
206
 Indeed, national courts were unable to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes as well 
as crimes against humanity. As a result, MONUC supported the establishment of the NHRO 
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and the TRC towards the ending of the culture of impunity in the DRC.
207
The establishment 
of a TRC was useful for promoting reconciliation.
208
 This commission was meant to 
investigate gross violations of human rights committed during the war and facilitate the 
creation of a past abuses record in the DRC. In this regard, MONUC and the international 
community engaged in the creation of a genuine and viable TRC in the DRC.
209
 
 
For the promotion and protection of human rights in the post conflict transition, the DRC 
constitution established the NHRO. To support the establishment of the NHRO, MONUC 
coordinated with the OHCHR in creating a national consultation on National Human Rights 
Institutions in 2003.
210
 The objectives and functions of the establishment of a NHRO were to 
investigate and prosecute cases of gross human rights committed by all parties during the 
civil war for the promotion and protection of human rights in the DRC. 
 
Furthermore, in order to assist the Congolese judicial system on the one hand, and to deal 
with all crimes committed for the end of impunity in the DRC on the other hand, the ICC 
opened investigations for perpetrators who were responsible for serious crimes committed 
since 2002. As a result, MONUC, during its patrols in Ituri and in the Kivus, helped the 
Congolese government to capture Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the leader of the UPC, a militia 
group. In 2006, the Congolese government transferred Thomas Lubanga to the ICC which 
charged him with war crimes and using children in armed combat. Another person, Thomas 
Lubanga‟s collaborator Bosco Ntangada, was charged with war crimes committed in Ituri and 
is still sought by the ICC.
211
 
 
4.5. Analysis of the effectiveness of MONUC with regard to democracy and human 
rights in the DRC 
 
From the eruption of the war in 1998 through to 2006, the year of national democratic 
elections, widespread human rights violations were committed in the country by all 
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belligerent factions and countries that were involved in the conflict. Most of the worst 
violations that were committed were rape, torture, forced recruitment of child soldiers, 
cannibalism, killing, internal displacement, threat, arrest and detention. During the period 
1998-2003, human rights worsened because of the war. Indeed, more than 3.3 million people 
were killed, particularly in the Eastern DRC, and thousands of Congolese people who were 
displaced were compelled to seek safety in neighboring countries, whereas instability and 
mass killing persisted in the areas controlled by rebel groups. The Ituri area was the perfect 
example in this case due to ethnic conflicts. Like the human rights realities, the political 
situation of the country was unstable.  
 
MONUC was committed to mainstreaming democracy and human rights in the DRC through 
the organisation of national elections in the DRC in order to put an end to abuses and wars for 
the achievement of peace. The involvement of MONUC in the DRC war started after the 
signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on 10 July 1999. Since its establishment, 
MONUC undertook to fulfil its mandate as well as find solutions between belligerent factions 
and the Congolese government through negotiations and the settlement of disputes. 
 
Under the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, MONUC was effective towards democracy in the 
DRC. Indeed, the positive support of MONUC to democracy further helped the DRC to deal 
with the challenge of peace implementation in a coherent way. During the transition period, 
MONUC made wide efforts to assist the Congolese government in the organisation of the 
first national democratic elections since independence in 1960. For instance, in terms of 
democracy, from 1999 through to 2002, MONUC separated warring parties and facilitated 
negotiations. Indeed, negotiations allowed the Congolese government and belligerent factions 
as well as the armed opposition and civil society to sign a peace agreement such as the ICD in 
2002 and 2003. The signature of the ICD had a major impact on the conflict environment that 
was characterised by a nearly five-year violent civil war. Following the ICD signature, an 
agenda for mutual interest and a stable peace development was set up for the future of the 
DRC which ended the five years of civil war and generated a shift from authoritarian rule to 
democracy. Since 2003 MONUC‟s partnership with the international community increased 
political legitimacy in the country. As a result of the ICD signature, Kabila‟s autocratic 
system formally ended with the redistribution of political power. In addition, an effective 
multi-party system and the legitimacy of institutions were restored. Although the UDPS 
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boycotted the democratic process, the 2006 national election experience provided the legal 
conceptual framework of democracy for the future.  
Regarding the human rights situation, was MONUC effective or ineffective in ending war as 
well as abuses committed in the DRC? According to Security Council resolution 1291 (2000) 
point eight, “MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its 
infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect the United Nations and 
the co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipments, ensure the security and 
freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under the imminent threat of 
physical violence”.212 In its beginnings in the DRC, MONUC was aware of various abuses 
committed in the Eastern DRC, but was unable to control its areas of deployment for the 
protection of civilians. Indeed, it failed to ensure the protection of civilians from armed 
clashes and violence for sustainable peace in all areas of its deployment. The Kisangani and 
Ituri escalations were most obvious to illustrate the ineffectiveness of MONUC in ending war 
and human rights abuses. For instance, in 2000 during the conflict between Ugandan and 
Rwandan forces (the Congo‟s Eastern neighbours) in Kisangani, MONUC neither intervened 
nor cooperated with the belligerents. As a result, thousands of civilians fled into neighbouring 
countries due to extensive bombing and fighting. Faced with this tragedy, women were 
victims of routine sexual violence from both armed forces during the time of the occupation.  
 
Furthermore, in June 1999 ethnic disputes between the Hema and the Lendu erupted over the 
controlling of land and mineral resources in Ituri. Human rights deteriorated between 2002 
and 2003 when different armed groups became involved in the war. Each tribe identified 
itself with an armed group of its choice which enabled the conflict to spread and become 
bitter. Therefore, the Hema allied with the UPC militia while the FNI armed group stood for 
the Lendu. As a result, 50.000 civilians were estimated dead following the violence in Ituri 
between 2002 and 2003.
213
 
 
The incapacity of MONUC to protect civilians from armed clashes and ethnic violence in 
Ituri dramatically hindered the war from ending. Furthermore, in the 2003 escalation, when 
the Ugandan Army invaded the town of Bunia, MONUC failed again in its mandate to protect 
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civilians. Although MONUC dealt with local militias in the region, various abuses such as 
looting, killing and raping continued to be committed. Facing a deteriorating security 
situation in Bunia, the Security Council authorised in its Artemis operation the deployment of 
an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to reinforce MONUC forces for the 
security of the town.
214
 The operation had a task of securing and protecting the civilians as 
well as the IDPs against the militia and the Ugandan Army attacks in the town. When the 
Artemis operation started, it took control of the ground by increasing the protection of 
civilians against abuses. Indeed, through the Artemis Operation, alongside a multinational 
force, MONUC helped the cause of human rights in the pacification of Ituri. Moreover, 
MONUC committed itself to providing security in the region. During the period 2003- 2005, 
the human rights situation slightly improved. A small number of mass atrocities and serious 
human rights abuses committed during the war were brought to justice such as Thomas 
Lubanga‟s case. In sum, the Artemis operation was useful in Ituri in protecting the population 
against human rights abuses.  
 
In 2004, MONUC was ineffective in the Bukavu crisis. As in the Bunia invasion, MONUC 
was supposed to protect civilians. War crimes and human rights abuses such as summary 
executions, rape, and looting against civilians based on ethnic criterion were committed by all 
the belligerent factions since 26 May 2004.
215
 MONUC failed again to ensure the protection 
of civilians in the safe zone. During the warring time, in some rebel held territories, MONUC 
investigated and carried out human rights investigations on allegations perpetrated by the 
militia and all the fighting groups such as the MLC and RCD-N for the case of Mambassa. 
Unfortunately those investigations did not have any impact on the promotion of human rights 
in the country. 
 
During the period surrounding the electoral campaign in 2006, the situation of human rights 
worsened with the restriction of the rights against several political party members. In 
addition, the transitional government continued to commit many serious abuses thus 
contributing to a decline of political rights and civil liberties. However, only a very small 
number of human rights abuses committed by the transitional government‟s security forces 
were prosecuted in court or investigated by MONUC in the fight against impunity. As such, 
civil liberties and political rights were not well protected during the 2002-2006 transitional 
                                                            
214 Ibid  
215 Human Rights Watch (7),  Op Cit 
 
 
71 
 
period. In this perception, the challenge to democracy and human rights persisted. Civil 
liberties and political rights still required a lot of improvement in order to establish 
democracy and promote human rights. Finally, MONUC started the human rights campaign 
by contributing to the establishment of the NHRO and TRC institutions which tackled the 
issues of impunity in order to promote and protect the human rights in the DRC and to restore 
democracy. However, this aspect did not allow MONUC to influence the promotion of the 
transitional justice. For instance, during its existence, the NHRO was ineffective. In this 
perception, the 2006 Global Integrity Report published that “the National Observatory of 
Human Rights remained a timid organ and inactive against the massive human rights 
violations during the transitional period”.216As a result, the political interferences influenced 
the institution rather than prosecuting the perpetrators of those abuses.
217
It was somewhat 
regrettable that in July 2006, the offices of the NHRO were demolished by political party 
members during the presidential campaigns of the same year.
218
 For that reason, the 
institution ceased to exist. 
 
With reference to the TRC‟s case of failing to prosecute the perpetrators of the serious crimes 
that were committed during the war, the institution seemed rather incompetent to deal with 
such atrocities committed in the DRC, thus leaving the majority of the perpetrators of 
massive human rights abuses unprosecuted. The majority of the aforesaid perpetrators were 
either promoted in the FARDC or in the Congolese government according to their political 
considerations.
219
   
 
As described above, although MONUC supported the Congolese people in achieving 
democracy through the holding of free and transparent elections, it failed to promote human 
rights observance. Human rights abuses still persist in some areas of the Kivus to date.  
 
4.6. Institutional liberalism approach to the role of MONUC in the DRC 
 
The study which examines the role of MONUC with regard to the promotion of democracy 
and human rights in the DRC and peacekeeping in the DRC argues that institutional 
liberalism appears to be the theory which highlights better the effectiveness of MONUC. The 
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latter, being a special UN peacekeeping mission established by the UN Security Council 
resolutions, ought to prevent the resumption of civil war and to enforce the peace deal in the 
DRC.  
 
A series of academic debates related to the impact and the support of peacekeeping in both 
intrastate and interstate conflicts demonstrated that peacekeeping operations help the 
establishment of lasting peace in a holistic way across countries torn apart by conflicts. A key 
element of these debates outlined the ideas that peacekeeping operations are “limited to 
maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situation on the ground, so that efforts could be made 
at the political level to restore the conflict by peaceful means.”220Explanations of academic 
debates were relevant to the impact and support of peacekeeping in conflicts. Moreover, 
academic debates were pertinent to understand the limits of the role of MONUC in the DRC. 
In recent years, UN peacekeeping operations evolved to meet the demands of different 
conflicts and changing landscape.
221
 In fact, in terms of promoting durable peace, the 
institutional liberalism approach to peacekeeping is based on the effectiveness of 
international institutions to promote democracy, personal security as well as the rule of law.  
 
Chapter one of this study provided a framework for the institutional liberalism approach to 
the role of MONUC in the DRC.  Moreover, the theory provided a much wider understanding 
of MONUC‟s support in the DRC conflict for sustaining a durable peace. Indeed, with the 
cooperation of belligerent factions, the Congolese government and the countries involved in 
the DRC conflict, MONUC succeeded to promote democracy with the holding of free and 
transparent elections in 2006. In this perspective, MONUC worked dynamically towards 
sustainable institutions of governance and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
of former combatants. As a result, the political landscape changed. These political changes 
contributed to putting an end to the wars and building a democratic culture in the DRC.  
Moreover, the rebuilding of a democratic culture paved the way for the organisation of the 
second democratic elections expected in 2011.   
 
Although many changes occurred on political aspects, the absence of effective peacekeeping 
to reach the UN standards of human rights was illustrated by examining personal security and 
the rule of law. Beside the creation of both the NHRO and the TRC for the promotion of 
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human rights in the country, MONUC did not achieve the UN standards of human rights in 
the DRC. The reasons for such failings were MONUC‟s lack of enough means to accomplish 
the material objectives of its mandate. In these circumstances, beside efforts and resources, 
MONUC did not fully achieve its goals in the DRC. 
 
Based on MONUC‟s experience in the DRC, it is tricky to affirm that the task was successful. 
However, relying on the 2006 democratic elections and on political changes, there was ample 
evidence that “the institutional liberalism approach to peacekeeping was helpful in preventing 
the resumption or escalation of violent conflict and establishing a durable and self-sustaining 
peace.”222 In fact, the analysis of the role of MONUC in the implementation of peace process 
in the DRC through the use of institutional liberalism approach was applied to address 
cooperation and negotiations with countries and belligerent factions involved in the DRC‟s 
conflicts. Therefore, the theoretical concepts of institutional liberalism and peacekeeping 
were relevant for the aim of this study. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As pointed out above, the situation of human rights in the DRC was very poor, especially 
during the time of the civil war. Each day widespread human right abuses were committed by 
all parties involved in the conflict. In addition to these abuses, the majority of perpetrators 
were not prosecuted and it is widely recognised that they are still living with impunity. 
Despite the establishment of the TRC and the NHRO for the promotion of the transitional 
justice in the DRC, those institutions were unable to deal with serious crimes against human 
rights. Therefore, impunity took place due to MONUC‟s lack of effectiveness to achieve its 
mandate through the TRC and the NHRO by prosecuting the perpetrators of crimes in the 
DRC.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The study highlighted the role of MONUC to prevent conflict and facilitate the promotion of 
democracy and human rights in the DRC. The first chapter examined the theory of 
institutional liberalism, a theoretical framework which explained better MONUC‟s 
commitment to the DRC‟s political problems and its effort to prevent the conflict spreading 
further. The second chapter provided the outline of a series of UN peacekeeping missions 
undertaken in Africa including MONUC in the DRC, in an attempt to visualize the UN‟s 
effectiveness within the context of larger conflicts. The third chapter addressed the two major 
phases of the transition process to democracy in the DRC:  the first phase covered the 1990-
1997 periods whereas the second covered the 2002-2006 periods leading up to the elections. 
To be clear, the 2006 elections significantly shaped the peace process that achieved the 
building of a democratic culture for the future in the DRC. Finally, the fourth chapter 
discussed MONUC‟s effectiveness with regard to democracy and human rights in the DRC 
and the FHI findings for analysing the broader UN peacekeeping mission in the restoration of 
democracy and human rights in the country. 
  
1. The Pre 1997 period 
 
The DRC used to be under Mobutu‟s military and corrupt dictatorship regime for more than 
30 years. Indeed, state repression paralysed the administration which led the country to both 
economic and political chaos. 
 
Although the democratic process started after President Mobutu‟s speech on 24 April 1990, 
the political situation worsened with the liberalisation which accompanied the transition. This 
system favoured a rapid growth of many political parties (440 political parties). Most of them 
had ethnic and regional characters and competed for power. With this picture, the country 
remained fragile and unstable due to the violence of tribal groups against each other. 
Moreover, the inconceivable conduct of some political actors led some areas of the country 
into ethnic conflicts. The opening of a SNC, a step towards democracy, inspired great hope in 
Congolese people to end a dictatorial regime and re-introduced a multi-party system for the 
country‟s future. During this period, Mobutu started to divide opposition parties by 
corrupting some of the political opponents. The outcome demonstrated a kind of formal 
bipolarisation of the political situation, relying on the ethno-regional mobilisation which 
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emerged and much weakened the democratic process. For instance, Mobutu‟s supporters in 
the province of Katanga came into conflict with the Luba population of the province of Kasai, 
and that situation killed thousands and displaced millions of people between 1992 and 1993. 
In the Kivus, the ethnic violence over land between the Hunde and the Banyarwanda people 
was characterised by persistent human rights violations which killed hundreds of civilians 
and forced thousands to flee into neighbouring countries. 
 
All in all, the political situation was in a permanent crisis. In this regard, democratic elections 
never took place and Mobutu continued to spread tribal conflicts to weaken the opposition 
parties. When Laurent Kabila toppled Mobutu from power on 17 May 1997, he banned all 
political party activities rather than consolidating the democratic process. 
 
2. 1999-2003    
 
The five years of the bloodiest war ever in the DRC killed millions of Congolese people. In 
an attempt to solve the political problems and restore peace, the UN Security Council 
established MONUC in response to the crisis in the country. MONUC enormously 
contributed in the DRC‟s implementation of peace. The Lusaka Peace Agreement opened a 
way to the signatory parties to cooperate under UN assistance for sustainable peace in the 
country. However, the 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreement had several obstacles to achieve peace, 
and therefore the 2002 ICD, which ushered in the establishment of the transitional 
government, came to solve the Lusaka Peace Agreement‟s insufficiencies. The signing of the 
ICD known as the “Global and All-Inclusive Agreement” gave an opportunity to MONUC to 
assist the transitional institutions during the transitional process. 
 
In accordance with its mandate, MONUC influenced the end of the Congo wars but failed to 
deal with the overall situation of serious violations committed in the Eastern DRC. In 2002, 
MONUC conducted, the DDRRR and DDR programmes for the security sector reform in the 
Kivus. Those programmes disarmed 9000 Mai-Mai combatants to integrate the FARDC and 
repatriated thousands of foreign soldiers such as Rwandese, Burundian and Ugandan soldiers. 
MONUC achieved some results by demobilising child soldiers from the militia through the 
UNICEF programme. However, MONUC‟s DDRRR and DDR programmes failed to disarm 
and demobilise all the militia and child soldiers during this period. In addition, during the 
same period, impunity and illegal access to weapons were not addressed. Despite MONUC‟s 
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commitment to address the issue of insecurity in the Kivus, human rights violations persisted 
in certain areas. 
 
3. 2003-2006 
 
The end of hostilities in the Eastern DRC in 2003 led to the establishment of a transitional 
government, a step forward towards a lasting reconciliation processes. In this regard, with the 
mandate to accompany Congolese people into the holding of free and transparent elections, 
MONUC assisted the transitional government with materials, human resources and financial 
supports through the Comité International d’ Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT). In 
addition, MONUC worked with the transitional government to define its strategies and goals 
during the transitional process. In this regard, MONUC contributed and assisted the IEC in 
the organisation of the referendum in 2005 and the successful 2006 national elections which 
paved the way to building a democratic culture since independence in 1960. Therefore, the 
organisation of the 2006 democratic elections was estimated the greatest success attributed to 
MONUC‟s performance in the DRC.  
 
Dealing with human rights abuses, although MONUC helped the Congolese government to 
capture and transfer Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the leader of the UPC to the ICC because of war 
crimes and the using of child soldiers, it (MONUC) did not achieve together with the 
Congolese judiciary system the prosecution of other cases of serious crimes committed in the 
DRC as well as an end to impunity. On the other hand, MONUC failed through the TRC and 
the NHRO to rebuild the national justice system for the protection of human rights as well as 
the ending of impunity of serious crimes in the DRC. 
 
Considering the DDRRR and DDR operations in the Kivus, MONUC continued to support 
those programmes according to its mandate. Despite considerable challenges in reintegrating 
some child soldiers and former combatants into society, MONUC succeeded to demobilise 
and disarm over 54,000 child soldiers and 9,000 Mai-Mai. In addition, around 15,000 foreign 
soldiers were repatriated to their respective countries. However, in some Eastern areas, 
MONUC was ineffective to protect civilians from human rights abuses. Yet, insecurity 
persisted in some areas of the Kivus. 
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Despite several criticisms against MONUC‟s role and ineffectiveness in the DRC, some 
progresses were made, especially in restoring democracy in the country.  
 
This thesis argues that MONUC„s presence in the DRC influenced the end of the five years of 
civil war and led to reconciliation among the Congolese. That is true; MONUC played a 
predominant role in bringing a democratic culture among the Congolese people through the 
2006 national elections. But on the other hand, MONUC failed to influence the functioning of 
the NHRO and the TRC during the transitional period for investigating and prosecuting war 
crimes in order to end with impunity. In this perspective, with the functioning of the 
aforementioned institutions, the DRC judicial system could have broken down an ongoing 
culture of impunity for the promotion of human rights in the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adebajo, A, “From Congo to Sudan: UN peacekeeping in Africa 1”, in Le Pere, G and 
Samasuwo, N, The UN at 60: A new spin on old hub, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, 
South Africa, 2006  
Adekeye, A and Landsberg, C, Back to the future: UN peacekeeping in Africa, EBSCO, 2002 
A Paramount Group White Paper, UN Member States Responsibility towards Peacekeeping 
Developments, www.paramountgroup.biz/uploads/assets/files/Whitepapers/11-un-member-
states-responsibility-towards-peacekeeping-deployments.pdf, June 2009 
Boehmer, C, Gartzke, E and Nordstrom, T, “Do Intergovernmental Organizations promote 
peace?”, World Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, Project MUSE, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2004 
Boshoff, H, “Overview of MONUC‟s military strategy and concept of operations”, in 
Challenges of Peace implementation: The UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
A joint project of the training for peace and the African Security Analysis programmes at the 
ISS, funded by the governments of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, 2004 
Boshoff, H and Wolters, S, Situation Report: Future Scenarios for the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Institute for Security Studies, www.iss.co.za/uploads/101005DRC.PDF, 2005. 
Brahm, E, Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), Beyond Intractability, 
www.beyondintractability.org/essay/role_igo/?nid=1328, 2005 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2004, Congo, Democratic Republic of the, 
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41597.htm, February, 2005 
Cisse-Gouro, M, “Human Rights Challenges during the transition: An OHCR Perspective” in 
Malan, M and Porto, J, Challenges of Peace implementation: The UN mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, A joint project of the training for peace and the African 
Security Analysis programmes at the ISS, funded by the governments of Norway, Sweden 
and Switzerland, 2004 
Christer, J and Jonas T, Institutional Theory in International Relations: Institutional Theory in 
Political Sciences, 
http://www.statsvet.su.se/publikationer/tallberg/joensson_tallberg_institutional_theory.pdf. 
Ciobanu, D, “The power of the Security Council to organize peacekeeping operations” in 
Cassese, A, United Nations Peacekeeping: Legal Essays, Alpena an den Rijn- the 
Netherlands, 1978  
Cohen, R, Hyden, G and Nagan, W, Human Rights and Governance in Africa, University 
Press of Florida, 1993 
Dagne, T, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments, 
Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40108.pdf, 2009 
 
 
79 
 
Dahrendorf, N, MONUC and the relevance of coherent mandates: The Case of the DRC, 
Chapter 3, dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/DCAF/.../chapter_dahrendorf_DRC.pdf.  
Dallaire, R and Poulin, B, UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda, 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0534.pdf, 1995 
Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2006,  Department 
of State in accordance with section 102 of the international religious freedom act 1998, 
http://hcfa.house.gov/110/38274.pdf , 2005 
Department of State in accordance with Sections 116(d) and 502B (b) of the Foreign 
assistance Act of 161, as amendment , Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004, 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/99700.pdf, Vol. I, September 2005 
Discussion Notes, Part One, “International commitment to peace in the DRC” in Malan, M 
and Porto, J, Challenges of Peace implementation: The UN mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, A joint project of the training for peace and the African Security Analysis 
programmes at the ISS, funded by the governments of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, 
2004 
Dong, V, World Vision Congo Communications Manager, Timeline of Democratic Republic 
of Congo History& Key Events, http://www.larryshort.com/congo/timeline.pdf.  
Dummet, M, Congo rebels guilty of cannibalism, mass rape-UN, Reuters-Alert Net, 
www2.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/eacea085bacc7974c1256ec40042c62b/0e77d64ed565eb2
185256caf0075b9e5?OpenDocument, January 2003 
Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA), DRC: National 
Observatory of Human Rights (Defunct), www.eisa.org.za/WEP/drcagency.htm, 2009 
Emeric, R, “The Inter-Congolese dialogue: A critical overview” in Malan, M and Porto, J,  
Challenges of peace implementation : The UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, A joint project of the training for peace and the African Security Analysis 
Programmes at the ISS, funded by the governments of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, 
2004 
Freedom House, Advancing Freedom for 70 years, Analysis “Freedom in the World”, edition 
2009, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=352&year=2009 
Freedom House, Advancing Freedom for the 70 years: Congo, Democratic Republic of 
(Kinshasa) (2007), edition 2007, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7308 
Freedom House, Freedom in the World-Congo, Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa) (2002), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2002&country=1034 
 
Freedom House, Advancing Freedom for 70 years: Freedom in the World- Congo, 
Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa) (2006), edition 2006, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7094&year=2006. 
 
 
80 
 
Garretón, R, Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/15, UN Commission of Human Rights 
www.afrol.com/Countries/DRC/documents/un_human_rights_2001.htm, , February 2001 
Guehenno, J, The evolution of peacekeeping: Part I, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section 
Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training Department of Peacekeeping Operations United 
Nations Secretariat, New York, 10017, 
www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf, March 
2008 
Hansen, W, Rambothan, O and Woodhouse, T, Hawks and Doves: Peacekeeping and 
Conflict Resolution, Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 
http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/hansen_etal_handbook.pdf, 2004. 
Horman, K, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, European 
Commission, May 2007 
Human Rights First, The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Ravaged by conflict, human 
rights atrocities and impunity, 
www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_justice/regions/DCR_Bckgrnd.pdf 
Human Rights Watch (5), “Democratic Republic of Congo: Journalists and Human Rights 
Defenders under fire”, Human Rights Watch briefing paper, No. 2, www.kongo-
kinshasa.de/dokumente/ngo/hrw_drc0606_en.pdf, June 2006 
Human Rights Watch (4), DRC‟s First Trial Focuses on Child Soldiers, 
www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/22/drc-icc-s-first-trial-focuses-child-soldiers, January, 2009 
Human Rights Watch (7), “D.R. Congo: War crimes in Bukavu”, Human Rights briefing 
paper, http://hrw.org(english/docs/2004/06/11/Congo8803.htm, June 2004 
Human Rights Watch (1), Human Rights Watch World Report 1995-Zaire, 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca9e1e.html  January 1995 
Human Rights Watch (2), ITURI: “COVERED IN BLOOD”: Ethnically Targeted violence in 
North-eastern DR Congo Human Rights Watch Report on the situation of human rights in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Vol.15, No. 11 (A), www.kongo-
kinshasa.de/dokumente/ngo/DRC0703.pdf, July 2003 
Human Rights Watch (3), “The curse of gold: Democratic Republic of Congo”, United States 
of America, ISBN: 1-56432-332-3, 2005.  
Human Rights Watch (6), What Future? Street Children in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,HRW,COUNTRYREP,COD,,4455d3944,0.html, 
April 2006 
International Federation for Human Rights, Democratic Republic of Congo “Breaking Cycle 
of Impunity”, www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/DRCsexualcrimeseng2008.pdf, March 2008 
Jackson, R and Sorensen, G, Introduction to International Relations, Theories and 
Approaches, Oxford University Press Inc, New York, 2003 
 
 
81 
 
Kabemba, C (2), Perspectives on the role of key stakeholders in the DRC‟s political 
transition: Realising effective and sustainable democratic governance in Southern Africa and 
beyond, EISA occasional paper No. 26,  www.eisa.org.za/PDF/OP26.pdf, 2004 
Kabemba, C (1), “The Democratic Republic of Congo”, in Clapham, C, Herbst, J and Mills, 
G (eds): Big African States, Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2001 
Kassa, M, “Humanitarian assistance in the DRC” in Malan, M and Porto, J,  Challenges of 
peace implementation: The UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, A joint 
project of the training for peace and the African Security Analysis Programmes at the ISS, 
funded by the governments of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, 2004 
Karns, M, “The United Nations at 60 and the future of its peacekeeping role” in  Le Pere, G 
and Samasuwo, N, The UN at 60: A new spin on old hub, Institute for Global Dialogue, 
Midrand, South Africa, 2006  
Kees, H, “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo” in European 
Commission, Faster and more united? The debate about Europe‟s crisis response capacity, 
Netherlands Institute for International Relations, Clingendael, Chapter 12 
www.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20070531_cscp_chapter_homan.pdf, May 2007 
Keohane, R, “International Institutions: Two approaches” in International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 32, No. 4, 1988 
Keohane, R and Martin L, “The promise of Institutional Theory” in International Security, 
Vol. 20, No. 1, The MIT Press, 1995 
Koko, S, “The „one- plus –four‟ formula and transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
African Security Review, Institute for Security Studies, Vol. 16 No. 1, 2007 
Kuperman, A, “Rethinking the Responsibility to protect” in The Whitehead Journal of 
Diplomacy and International Relations, 
www.strausscenter.org/system/uploads/4/original/Kuperman-Whitehead-R2P-2009-
final.pdf?1266510828, 2009 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Art III, 11 a, 
www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/drcongo/cdreader/bin/2lusaka.pdf 
Mac Queen, N, Peacekeeping and the International System, Routledge, New York, 2006  
Malan, M and Porto, J, “Monuc‟s contribution to security in the DRC” in Challenges of 
Peace implementation: The UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, A joint project 
of the training for peace and the African Security Analysis programmes at the ISS, funded by 
the governments of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, 2004 
Mangu, A, M and Budeli, M, Democracy and Elections in Africa in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo: Lessons for Africa, Law, Democracy & Development, 
http://ajol.info/index.php/ldd/article/viewFile/52884/41484.pdf, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2008 
Missionary Atlas Project Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo (formally Zaire), 
http://worldmap.org/maps/other/profiles/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo/Re
public%20of%20the%20Congo.pdf 
 
 
82 
 
MONUC: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo-MONUC- Mandate 
www.monuc.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/mandate.html 
 Mobekk, E, MONUC: DDRRR, DDR, Military and Rule of Law reform-reducing violence 
against Women, Action Aid Report, Recommendations for change, 2006 
Nest, M, Grignon, F and Kisangani E, The Democratic Republic of the CONGO: Economic 
dimensions of war and peace, International Peace Academy, Lynne Rienner publishers, 
Colorado, USA, 2006 
Office of Women in Development, USA Agency for International Development, Intrastate 
Conflict and Gender, Information Bulletin No. 9, 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACP514.pdf, December 2000 
OUNHCHR, The human rights situation in the democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), report 
by the MONUC Human rights division, 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UNHROBiannualReport01to062007.pdf, February 
2007 
Radmann, W, The Nationalization of Zaire‟s Copper: From Union Miniere to GECAMINES, 
Indiana University Press, 1977 
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of 
the Secretary Council on 31 January 1992, An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and peacekeeping, www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf, A/47/277-S/24111, 
June 1992 
Rikhye, I, The theory and practice of peacekeeping, published for the International Peace 
Academy by C. HURST & Company, London, 1984  
Serafini, M, N, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Division, Peacekeeping and Related 
Stability operations: Issues of US Military Involvement, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IB94040.pdf, 2006 
Shabbir, C, G, Democracy and development: A conceptual framework, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan005781.pdf 
Sorensen, G, Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and World 
Order in the New Millennium, 
www.fpvmv.umb.sk/fpvmv_www/phprs/storage/File/ksp/GLUN/IR_2006_3_Soerensen_libe
ralism_liberal_order.pdf, International Relations, SAGE, 2006 
 
Stembler, S, An overview of content analysis Yale University PACE Centre, 
http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=9&n=4, 2004 
Swarbrick, P, “DDRRR: Political Dynamics and Linkages” in Malan, M and Porto, J, 
Challenges of Peace implementation: The UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
A joint project of the training for peace and the African Security Analysis programmes at the 
ISS, funded by the governments of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, 2004 
 
 
83 
 
The American Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition for the International Criminal 
Court, THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR V BOSCO NTANGADA AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.amicc.org/docs/Ntaganda.pdf  
Tshiyoyo, D, Democratic Republic of Congo: Road to Political Transition, Electoral and 
Political Processes (EPP), EISA, www.eisa.org.za/PDF/drc2006background.pdf, 2006 
Tull, D, M, Peacekeeping in the DRC: Waging Peace and Fighting War, International 
Peacekeeping, Routledge, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533310802685729, 2009 
UNHCR, Attacks on Justice-Democratic Republic of Congo, 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/48abdd680.pdf 
UNHCR, Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Centre for Documentation and Research, Geneva, 
www.asylumlaw.org/docs/congodemocraticrepublic/UNHCR_Congo_2000.pdf, May 2000 
United Nations, Somalia-UNOSOM II Mandate, 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2mandate.html 
United Nations Information Service, 60 years of United Nations Peacekeeping: Looking 
back/Moving forward, Vienna International Centre, 
www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/60years_peacekeeping.pdf, May 2008 
United Nations Peacekeeping in the service of peace, Operation Artemis: The lessons of the 
emergency multinational, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit Military Division, 
www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Artemis.pdf, 2004 
United Nations Report, MONUC UN Mission in DR Congo, The Human Rights situation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
http://monusco.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wtFw3QXSGlU%3D&tabid=4135
&mid=3999, July 2006. 
United Nations Security Council (4), Fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, www.kongo-
kinshasa.de/dokumente/uno/N0427867.pdf, March 2004 
United Nations Security Council (5), Resolution 1291, www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-
1291(2000).pdf, S/RES/12919, February 2000 
United Nations Security Council (1), Resolution 1376, www.grandslacs.net/doc/2369.pdf, 
2001 
United Nations Security Council (3), Resolution 1671, S/RES/1671(2006), 
www.grandslacs.net/doc/3999.pdf, April 2006 
United Nations Security Council (2), Twenty-second report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Organisations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, www.un-
casa.org/CASAUpload/ELibrary/759.pdf, 2006 
United Nations University, Towards a Human Security: Approach to Peace building, 
Research Brief, http://yblk-ext-proxy.appspot.com/www.unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-
briefs/2010/UNU_ResearchBrief_10-02.pdf, 2010 
 
 
84 
 
US Agency for International Development, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and 
Humanitarian assistance (DCHA), and Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), 
Democratic Republic of the Congo-Complex Emergency, Situation report, 
www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/drc/fy2003/
DRC_CE_SR02_04-16-2003.pdf, April 2003 
Zehra, F, Democracy and human rights in developing countries, Lynner Rienner Publishers  
Inc, USA, 1991 
 
 
